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Abstract 
In this thesis, I set out to explore Somaliland state formation – an internationally unrecognised 
breakaway state. Instead of analysing the official policies and centralised state institutions as 
previous studies have focussed on, I analyse Somaliland state formation in one of the margins of 
the state: Hargeisa Egal International Airport. I analyse historical and contemporary state 
formation processes by turning the analytical lens towards this particular border site of the state. 
Based on material produced through seven weeks of fieldwork in Hargeisa in March and April, 
2014, I unfold state formation processes through three main themes: 1) the historical 
transformations of airport functions, 2) the current renovation and securitisation projects of the 
airport and 3) everyday encounters between airport agents and individuals. 
One of the main findings of the thesis shows that airport’s functions have been recast in relation 
to surrounding dynamics and types of state rule. The history of the airport reveals that the airport 
has been an arena in which various actors have fought over the control of the airport. I found 
that the airport has been, and still is, central in the narration of the Somaliland state formation.  
Secondly, by looking at two current rehabilitation projects at the airport, I illustrate that a web of 
transnational actors and international airport norms help shape the current reformation of the 
airport. I argue that by looking at the reformation of the airport it becomes evident that state 
formation in Somaliland proceeds by the state’s strategic use of external resources and ties 
depicting a rather different state process than the one that can be found in the predominant 
analysis of Somaliland state formation. Thirdly, through observations and analysis of the everyday 
encounters at the airport, I illustrate that the state makes the individual visible to the state and 
the state visible to the individual. This I argue manifests the image of a sovereign state. Lastly, 
examples from different field observations indicate that state practices are constantly contested 
and negotiated in and around the airport. 
Thus, the overall finding is that state formation occurs in multiple arenas across the Somaliland 
territory and much can be learned by moving our analytical lens towards the margins of the state. 
It is in the margins of the state that one can meet the actors who constantly (re)form, construct, 
contest, and negotiate the state in everyday interactions. Margins are thus competent places for 
analysing and nuancing state formations. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Welcome to Somaliland:  
Somaliland is a self-claimed independent state 
bordering the Northern part of Somalia. At the 
collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991, the region of 
Somaliland broke away from the Somali Republic and 
have ever since experienced remarkable 
transformations, such as maintaining a high level of 
public security, building ministries, schools, as well as 
establishing a respected police force (Ken Menkhaus, 
2007: 91 - 93). Somaliland has embarked upon an 
impressive state formation process. Further, it has 
been termed as a success story in the Horn of Africa by Seth Kaplan (2008) as well as described 
as a ‘de facto state’ (see i.e. Marleen Renders & Ulf Terlinden, 2010: 723). Despite of its 
remarkable achievements in an otherwise conflictual and chaotic region, Somaliland remains 
unrecognised as a sovereign state by the international community and is still regarded part of 
Somalia; a country repeatedly labelled as a failed state (see i.e. Foreign Policy, 2013). However, 
Somaliland has not disappeared nor have they given up their claim for recognition. Rather 
they keep seeking to fulfil their vision by consistently acting internationally as well as nationally 
as a state. Somaliland has built up its infrastructure, such as ports, airports and road networks 
(Jean-Paul Azam, 2011: 155). The airport: Hargeisa Egal International Airport in the capital 
of Hargeisa will serve as the empirical field of this master thesis. I conducted seven weeks of 
field research. However, before going into depth with what I did I will present the dominant 
analysis of Somaliland’s ‘remarkable’ state formation.  
 
1.1 The Dominant Analysis of Somaliland State Formation 
A relatively small group of scholars have studied the dynamics of Somaliland state formation. 
Gérard Prunier (1998), one of these scholars, has analysed the non-recognised status of 
The Economist, 2009 
5 
 
Somaliland and argues that this status has had concrete implications on its state formation 
processes. Since Somaliland is still regarded as part of Somalia by the international community 
multi- and bilateral aid goes through the administration in Mogadishu and therefore cannot be 
donated directly to the Somaliland government in the capital of Hargeisa. These constraints 
have resulted in a ‘going it alone’ strategy in Somaliland, as Prunier calls it. He cont inues by 
pointing out that while the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) spent $4 billion 
in the South without furthering the cause of peace, none was spend in Somaliland (Ibid: 228). 
Some observers say that the non-interference of the international community has actually 
created a space for the Somalilanders – or Northern Somalis – to build a state from below, 
which is not based on strategies or ideologies of the international community (Nikolas 
Eubanks, 2012). The ‘state formation from below explanations’ is presented in the general 
scholarly work on Somaliland. Most Somaliland state formation analyses explore how the state 
has been constructed with no – or very little – outside interference, and argue that these 
dynamics have led to innovative ‘home-grown peace and state-building processes’  
(Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim & Ulf Terlinden, 2010). One of the most evident examples of 
these alternative solutions is the bicameral set-up of the parliament. In short, the parliament 
consists of a so-called ‘traditional’ governing body – known as the ‘House of Guurti’ consisting 
of elders who are not publicly elected, ruling alongside a so-called ‘modern’ democratic 
governing body made up of publicly elected politicians in a lower house (for discussions see 
Ioan Myddin Lewis (2008), Mark Bradbury (2008), Markus Virgil Höhne (2006a), and Renders 
& Terlinden 2010). Bradbury (2008) and I. M. Lewis (1961, 1980 and 2008) are two of the 
most predominant scholars within the studies of Somaliland state formation processes. 
However, these thorough and interesting pieces focus primarily on the state in terms of its 
official politics and central democratic institutions. The focus on the historical official policies, 
and shifting central governments is evident in Bradbury’s conclusion: “Somaliland has 
demonstrated in their own way and on their own terms, an alternative path to building a state and a system of 
government that is consistent with their own culture” (2008: 257). Furthermore Bradbury’s conclusion 
underlines the distinctiveness of Somaliland’s political set up. My aim is to shift focus away 
from Somaliland’s official political setup towards a margin of the state that has not been 
explored so far. 
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1.2 A New Analytical Lens: Towards an Analysis of Somaliland in the 
Margins of the State 
Following Michel Foucault argument that power of the central state apparatus is exaggerated, 
I seek to look at other sites where the state can be analysed (1991: 91). Foucault further claims 
that power-relations can be revealed by examining the practices and activities of the way in 
which a multifaceted series of various formal and informal institutions seek to govern the 
population (Ibid). This means that the state is constructed by various institutions and not only 
those close to the central state administration leading to Foucault’s well-known claim that the 
“(…) state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction” (Ibid: 103). Anthropologist 
Talal Asad also argues that the state is abstract by nature though according to him it becomes 
concrete and visible through the actors and institutions representing it (2004: 281 – 282). He 
further argues that these actors and institutions will be met at the margins defining margins as 
“(…) places where state law and order continually have to be re-established” (Ibid: 279). Margins 
demarcate the boundaries or borders of the state – where it begins and ends. Borders and 
boundaries have been a central topic for a variety of scholars within the social sciences. 
Plentiful have studied where one phenomenon starts and another begins, where phenomena 
collide, and how they overlap or interlink. The social-anthropologist Frederik Barth has 
studied borders of identity (1999). He argues that it is at the borders that we are able to localise 
and analyse the core features of identity at the concluding that ‘identity’ becomes visible in the 
meeting with ‘others’ (Ibid: 27 – 30). Combining Foucault’s notion on the state as a social 
construct, Asad’s conclusion on actor concreteness, and Barth’s argument about the analytical 
strength of border places it is in the margins of the state – away from the abstract centre – 
that I will place my study of Somaliland state formation. 
At this point, it is important to me to clarify that I view state formation processes as a constant 
production of images and practices produced by the institutions that seek to represent itself 
as a state. Additionally, I would like to make clear that I do not view state formation as a linear 
process; on the contrary, I perceive state formation as being constantly (re)produced, 
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negotiated, and contested by various formal and informal actors at multiple sites (see Joel S. 
Migdal and Klaus Schlichte, 2005). 
 
1.2.1 Hargeisa Egal International Airport 
Hargeisa Egal International Airport (HGA) is one such border place, and it will serve as the 
margin wherefrom I embark upon my investigation. HGA is located on the outskirts of 
Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa and has since 2012 been undergoing a major reformation project . 
The airport’s outdoor facilities are being renovated and the indoor security procedures are 
being enhanced by installing a variety of security equipment (Somalilandsun, 2012a). Despite 
the challenges of the non-recognition status of Somaliland and related issues with lack of 
capital inflow (see World Bank, 2012: 36), the airport is said to be on the way of becoming a 
regional trade hub in the Horn of Africa (Financial Times, 2013). This call for analysing how 
HGA has reached this point, how it is being renovated and securitised in the light of non-
recognition, and how the state seek to represent itself in the airport.  
Leonard C. Feldman has argued that airports are places where entrance to the state is 
controlled and therefore in fact a site for strategic deployment of sovereignty (2007: 333 See 
also Hastings Donnan & Thomas M. Wilson 1999: 1). Following this, along with Asad and 
Barth’s arguments, I will unfold the Somaliland state formation processes at the border as I 
see it as a central site for a visible and tangible deployment of sovereignty. It should be noted 
that I do not want to go into a profound theoretical discussion on the concept of state 
sovereignty, nor is it my errand to declare whether Somaliland is a sovereign state or not. Here 
I use sovereignty to frame the thesis acknowledging Somaliland’s claim of being an 
independent state and leaving behind the paradox of its empirical existence despite of failed 
recognition.  
From the above follows that I view the airport as an institution within the state and the airport 
management and authorities as representatives of the state. This also means that I perceive 
airport personnel as agents of the state and from here and onwards, I will refer to these, 
whether being guards, tax collectors, or passport controllers as airport agents. I do so as I do 
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not perceive the government as being the sole actor, rather I include international, private, and 
non-governmental actors as of the state. 
 
1.3 Problem Area & Structure of Thesis  
The observations and reflections above leads me to the following problem statement, which 
will guide my analysis: 
With Hargeisa Egal International Airport (HGA) as my empirical outset, I set out to investigate how 
historical events, changing actors, contemporary practices, and mobility-regulations at the border institution 
HGA have formed and continuously reform the Somaliland state. 
The problem area takes point of departure in the above-presented theoretical position on state 
formation and preliminary observations of Somaliland and HGA causing this thesis to seek to 
move beyond the predominant analysis of Somaliland state formation and turn attention to 
one of the margins of the state where interesting dynamics of Somaliland state formation 
processes will be visible. I do so by viewing the state as a historical construct and analyse how 
Somaliland is constantly being represented and practiced as a state.  
With this scope in mind, I have identified three main themes I find interesting in the analysis 
of HGA, which will be used to open up for relevant analyses of Somaliland state formation in 
more general terms. Firstly, I find it relevant to study the history of the airport and its role in 
the larger history of Somaliland’s state formation. In other words I wi ll disclose the changing 
functions of the airport and relate its role to broader state formation processes. Secondly, in 
the light of the current reformation projects, I will unfold the web of actors and norms 
involved at the airport and describe how these are brought into play. This will clarify current 
state dynamics and seek to unfold the ways in which state formation proceeds. Thirdly, I will 
shed light upon how the state is being reproduced, negotiated, and contested through concrete 
airport practices that regulate mobility and what these dynamics mean to the image and 
practices the Somaliland state. 
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When scrutinising the transformations of the airport in relation to the airport’s role in the 
history of Somaliland I want to uncover how the airport has transformed along with other 
state formation processes. Thus, the first research question goes: 
1. How has Hargeisa Egal International Airport helped shape the broader Somaliland state formation 
history? 
The first research question will be answered through Chapter III, which marks the beginning 
of the analytical chapters. I here unfold historical Somaliland state formation processes 
through key events from the airport history. 
Secondly, I dwell on the current reformation dynamics at the airport to demonstrate how state 
formation in Somaliland proceeds leading to the second research question:  
2. How are various actors, norms, and logics deployed in the reformation of Hargeisa Egal International 
Airport, and what does this tell about current state formation processes? 
By digging into the norms and various actors involved in the current reformation of the 
airport. This question is examined in Chapter IV. 
Carrying on, I examine the airport practices of mobility regulations to analyse how the 
Somaliland state is being reproduced, contested, and negotiated today. Leading me to research 
question number three: 
3. How do everyday mobility regulations and encounters between airport agents and individuals at 
Hargeisa Egal International Airport shape images and practices of the Somaliland state? 
The question is handled in Chapter V - the last analytical chapter; here I examine the practices 
of mobility regulations and their local implications. Moreover, I analyse the image of 
Somaliland as constructed in the encounters between airport agents and individual traveller 
and what these encounters can tell about current state formation processes. 
Lastly, in Chapter VI I sum up my main findings and make some concluding remarks, 
including ideas for further studies. This concluding chapter thus give answer to the problem 
statment above. Before beginning the three analytical chapters, I will in Chapter II, lay out 
and reflect on my methodological choices and the concrete methods I employed to produce 
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the data for analysis as well as my strategy for organising and analysing my empirical material. 
Before proceeding I will wrap up this introductory chapter clarifying how my thesis can 
contribute to academia and lastly give a short introduction to clan structure in Somaliland.  
 
1.4 Contribution to Academia  
Before moving on to the methodological chapter, I would like to reflect on how the thesis 
contributes to two main bodies of literature I have identified. Firstly, I explain how my thesis 
adds to other studies of Somaliland. Secondly, I elaborate on how I inscribe my thesis within 
‘the anthropology of the state’. One of the main aspirations for my endeavour into the research 
of Hargeisa Egal International Airport in Somaliland is to be able to contribute to these two 
bodies of literature, through first hand empirical research and thereby nuancing the processes 
of Somaliland state formation. 
 
1.4.1 Studies of Somaliland State Formation Processes 
Although the literature on Somaliland is relatively scarce it is more comprehensive than studies 
of the southern part of Somalia and of Puntland, this is possibly due to the higher level of 
security in Somaliland and thus easier accessibility. The immense anthropological research of 
Lewis – who has been called the “(…) founding father of Somali Studies’” (Markus V. Höhne & 
Virginia Luling, 2010: 1) – was conducted during the late period of the British colonial period. 
Lewis analyses revolve around Somali cultures, politics, history, and language. One of Lewis’ 
most important contributions is: ‘Pastoral Democracy: A study of Pastoralism among the 
Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa’ (1961). The book gives historical insights into 
Northern Somalia, clan structures, and the political structures of what today is Somaliland 
(Ibid). Lewis has been criticised, most directly, by Catherine Besteman (1996) for being too 
narrowly focused on clans and clan structure when explaining Somali state formation. She 
further argues that Lewis ignored race and class in his analysis, and that these dynamics are 
equally important in the understanding of the politics and violence after the Somali 
independence. Her critique led to a bitter academic dispute between Lewis and Besteman (See 
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Lewis, 1998 and Besteman, 1998). Although not directly taking part in this discussion I will 
nuance and give my interpretation of Somaliland state formation by analysing historical as well 
as contemporary airport dynamics. 
Abdi Ismail Samatar (1989) and Lidwien Kapteijns (1995) have both presented a slightly 
different view on Northern Somali state formation processes and argue that the Somali society 
has transformed from being clan based to being class based (Samatar, 1989 see especially: p. 152 
– 162; Kapsteijns, 1995). A more recent interpretation of Somaliland state formation can be 
read in Bradbury’s ‘Becoming Somaliland’, in which he gives an in-depth description of 
Somaliland culture, economics and politics, as well as depicts the importance of customary 
institutions and how political interests collided and interacted in the building of a ‘new’ 
Somaliland (2008 see especially 109 – 136). Michael Walls has similarly depicted how “(…) 
local resources have been effectively employed in the cause of achieving a lasting peace and what appears to be a 
viable system of democracy” (2009: 389). His main argument is that the incorporation of Somaliland 
social norms in the peace building processes is one of the main reasons for its success (Ibid).  
The anthropologist Höhne has criticised Bradbury for what he call an underlying teleological 
view on Somaliland state formation (2008: 692). Höhne does not argue against Bradbury’s 
findings rather he points out that Bradbury builds his findings on interviews with ‘pro -
Somaliland people’, mainly from the capital of Hargeisa, and neglects experiences of people 
living in the outskirts of Somaliland. According to Höhne the people living in the eastern part 
of Somaliland1 on the border to Puntland are pragmatically making use of possibilities on both 
sides of the border. Moreover the people inhabiting these areas “(…) take pride in being the ones 
holding secessionist Somaliland with war-torn Somalia together” (Höhne, 2006b: 409). Thus, state 
formation processes in Somaliland are not equally experienced across the Somaliland territory.  
This is why I also acknowledge that my study will not give the full picture of state formation 
but rather nuance the predominant interpretations. 
My contribution to this field will be to look beyond the state-centric analytic of Somaliland, 
which seems to focus on either clan vs class based interpretations of state formation, on the 
transformation from clan based to class based society, or on the analysis of the incorporation 
                                                 
1 Focussing on Dhulbahante clan-members 
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of ‘traditional’ norms in ‘modern’ democratic state institutions. Keep in mind that I am not 
arguing that these are irrelevant. Quite the contrary, I regard these researches as pertinent and 
interesting readings of Somaliland, and I will make use of these in my analysis whenever 
suitable. 
 
1.4.2 Anthropology of the State 
This leads me to the other body of academic literature where I see my research contributing  
namely: the anthropology of the state – at times also ‘socio-anthropology of public spaces’ 
(Jean-Pierre Olivier De Sardan, 2005). Scholars engaged in anthropological research of the 
state and public spaces focus on the everyday workings of the state or actor with state-like 
functions, and the interactions between the ‘users of the state’ and ‘state administrators’ 
(Olivier De Sardan, 2005). Researchers who have been contributing to the ‘anthropology of 
the state’ have studied the everyday practices of the state within a range of themes. These 
studies vary from liquid waste management in Ghana (Sjaak van der Geest & Nelson Obirih-
Opareh, 2009), over democratic processes in Benin (Thomas Bierschenk, 2009), and ways of 
coping with institutional uncertainties (Pierre-Yves Le Meur, 1999), to politics in refugee 
camps (Simon Turner, 2009). These studies analyse – in different ways – state dynamics by 
going into depth with specific state processes. Thus, anthropology of the state is engaged with 
unfolding the state by thematically analysing certain ‘sites’ – or spaces – wherein state officials 
and subjects meet and make the state visible. 
In the same manner, my study of the airport will thematically analyse the historical state 
formation processes, the proceedings of current state formation, and the ways in which the 
individual faces state representatives at the airport. 
Much of the burgeoning literature from ‘the anthropology of the state’ is focussing on 
institutional and political processes stemming from the delivery of a range of public and 
collective goods or services delivered by the state, non-state actors, social groups, individuals, 
or private actors (See Giorgio Blundo & Pierre-Yves Le Meur, 2009: 1 – 37). These processes 
have been scrutinised through very different themes. Corruption is one of the recurring 
themes, which has been analysed by Olivier De Sardan – one of the dominant scholars within 
13 
 
the studies of everyday corruption in Africa (Olivier De Sardan, 1999, see also Mahaman 
Tidjani Alou, 2006). The studies analyse corruption from the actors’ points of view and show 
that corruption runs through certain sociocultural norms. Olivier De Sardan has investigated 
how civil servants in Africa often navigate between official policy norms – copied from 
European patterns – and norms from everyday practices with logics that often contradict 
official norms (1999: 47). In this regard I draw on Olivier De Sardan even though my aim is 
to analyse airport management and not corruption I still take point of departure in norms and 
logics in order to analyse how the airport management and authorities navigate within these.  
One of the great contributors to this body of literature is Michel-Rolph Trouillot who defines 
the border as being “(…) the space between centralized governments with national territorial claims where 
encounters between individual and state power are most visible” (Trouillot, 2003: 80). This links well 
with my ambition of unfolding the state by analysing the history, practices, and images of the 
airport. In his chapter called ‘The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization’ 
Trouillot continues by stating that we ought to look beyond the centralised governmental 
apparatus when analysing the state. Instead, we should be concerned with the state in terms 
of practices, functions, and effects without prejudice about site or encounter (Ibid: 89). 
Following this, I will not exclude non-state actors in reformation of the airport neither 
predetermine the site of governmental actors to local, national, or international ‘locations’. My 
contribution will thus be – in Trouillot terminology – to analyse the airport within a multi-
scalar scope of analysis. 
 
1.5 A short Introduction to Clan Structures in Somaliland 
To round this chapter off, I will give a short introduction to clans in Somaliland which is 
meant to enable readers to navigate among the different clans I will refer to. I would like to 
mention that Somali clan names are spelled differently depending on the source one confer 
with. I have seen a number of different spellings, i.e. I spell one central clan in my thesis 
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‘Edagalle’, but I have seen the clan spelled as ‘Idagalle’, ‘Eidagalle’, ‘Aidagalle’ , and a number 
of other ways2. 
According to Lewis, the Somali clan system is best understood as a set of ‘clan families’ with 
a number of sons – or ‘clans’. Altogether six ‘clan families’ exists in the Somali regions: Dir,  
Hawiye, Darood, Digil, Rahanwiin and Isaaq (Lewis, 1961: 7). The latter is the largest in 
Somaliland, however clan members from other ‘clan families’ live within the Somaliland 
territory as well, such as the Gadabuursi clan members of the Dir ‘clan family’, and 
Dhulbahante clan-members of Darood. The Isaaq ‘clan family’ is separated into two main 
branches: Habar Habuusheed consisting of the sons: ‘Ahmad’, ‘Muuse’, ‘Ibrahim’, and 
‘Mohamed’, and Habar Magaadle consisting of the sons: ‘Awal’, ‘Ayuub’, ‘Ismail (or Garhajis)’ ,  
and ‘Arab’3 (Lewis, 1961: 156). These sons are what Lewis calls ‘clans’ and each clan has a 
number of ‘sub. The ‘sub-clans’ are then again divided into ‘sub-sub clans’ (Ibid: 5). 
It is here important to note that clans are structured along patrimonial lineages. Thus, all clans 
can be traced back to a common male ancestor (Ibid: 1). For instance, Edagalle is a ‘sub -clan’ 
of the Garhajis ‘clan’, which is a clan of the Isaaq ‘clan family’. This also means that clans 
divide Somalis into separate clans, however, all clans are related and eventually meet up at the 
top of the family tree4 - a system often referred to as a ‘segmentary descent system’ (Luling, 
2006: 473; Lewis, 1961: 7). In times of confrontations, disputes, or conflicts the clans with the 
closest affiliation will help ‘cousin’ clans (Luling, 2006: 473).  The people from the Garhajis 
clan and from the Edagalle sub-sub clan mostly inhabit the area around the airport, but this 
does not mean that people from other clans cannot live in this area. Clans are creating peace, 
conflicts, politics; they socialise and create economic ties across the clan divides.  
This introduction to clan structures is a highly simplified version of the Somaliland clan 
system. The structures of clans and their significances in Somali society are disputed 
(Kapteijns, 2004). However, the basic features, that clan structures are ingrained in most 
                                                 
2 As my Somali, unfortunately, is very limited I will refer to these clans in the way I have read the particular clan names 
the first time, and as my key informants have spelled names for me. It is very likely that I mix up different styles of spelling 
clan names and places, for any such mistakes I apologise. 
3 Field notes, March 23, 2014 
4 The family tree is a European constructed way of understanding and visualising genealogical  systems and not necessarily 
the way Somalis understand the clan system. Luling states that in Somali culture(s) there is no common standard diagram 
for mentally depicting the clan structures (Luling, 2006: 474 - 475) 
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aspects of the Somali societies and based on a segmentary descent system, will be helpful when 
I refer to various clans in Chapter III. 
I will now move on to the empirically produced data and methods I utilised.  
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Chapter II: Methodology 
“The researcher in the field begins by improvising awkwardly, until he 
becomes, little by little, capable of improvising competently” 
(Olivier De Sardan, 2008: 5) 
  
The present chapter will present and reflect on the methods I utilised to produce my data as 
well as the process of transforming data into written text. I will discuss my methodological 
choices and the implication of these. In relation, I will discuss the kind of material I have 
produced, as well as ethical issues I encountered during my fieldwork. The qualitative material 
fall into two broad categories. One is the material produced in Hargeisa during my fieldtrip 
through primarily ‘participant observation’ and ‘elite & expert interviews’. The other category 
is what I call ‘secondary material’. These take the shape of academic as well as journalistic 
articles, books, and updates from research groups, international organisations, and the like. 
Firstly, I elaborate on the types of material I produced and the techniques by which I produced 
the data. While doing so, I will discuss relevant issues in these processes, such as time, ethical 
considerations, and power relations in the interview situation. Lastly, I will reflect on the data 
processing and discuss my choices of categorisation. However, before doing so I will introduce 
‘the field’ that constituted my fieldwork. 
 
2.1 ‘The Field’ 
I stayed in Hargeisa for seven weeks, from March 17 to April 30, 2014. Although I was looking 
forward to go home by the end of my stay, I could easily have spent double the amount of 
time researching and digging deeper into the subject. I was fortunate enough to have the 
possibility for accommodation at the University of Hargeisa’s (UoH) guesthouse. The Institute 
of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) at UoH arranged my visa and lodging. Altogether, I 
conducted 16 arranged interviews of very different character. Besides the interviews, I had 
numerous day-to-day conversations with students at UoH. These conversations are part of 
my participant observation as they helped me to diversify ‘stories’ and obtain other narratives 
than those from experts, technocrats, and politicians, and thus get a broader depiction of the 
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Somaliland history and state. While the diversification of my material broaden my vision it 
also made me aware of some complexities I did not plan to engage in before going to the field.  
One of the first immediate complexities I encountered was the structure of the clan system 
and the ways in which they are interwoven with various economic, social, and political aspects 
of the Somaliland society. Although, I never understood the clan system into depth, my 
enquiry on the matter opened up for a broad variety of discussions which made me reflect on 
different concepts such as religion, gender, politics, and business relations and gave me a 
broader comprehension of the Somaliland context. The aim of the present dissertation is not 
to explain the clan-structures; however, the clan structures’ importance in the Somaliland 
society is concrete and unavoidable and is a subject any scholar dealing with Somaliland must 
confront in some way (see section 1.5). 
At this stage, I would like to point attention to the term ‘the field’ as a site for research. One 
must be aware of how one as a researcher create the space chosen to investigate, and in such 
a process open up for certain types of knowledge and block off other types (Akhil Gupta and 
James Ferguson, 1997: p. 15 - 16). Meaning, that the choice of research entail certain 
possibilities as well as delimitations. In my case, the focus on the airport, the management , 
and bureaucracy behind blocks off the everyday experiences and lived lives of the 
Somalilanders living in the surrounding areas of the airport. Furthermore, I focused on 
Hargeisa Egal International Airport not simply existing as a physical place, but equally 
important as consisting of the people involved in the renovation of the airport: ministries, 
development agencies, construction companies, and the like. As I was interested in the 
historical state-formation processes ‘my field’ also consisted of the people I would meet at the 
university, elders, intellectuals, historians and other scholars with insight into the history of 
the airport and its role in the Somaliland narrations. In continuation, I was predominantly 
interested in listening to stories from governmental personnel (ministers, former minister, 
director generals, and others who could represent certain ministries) as well as elders from the 
Edagalle and Garhajis clans, as they were the two main actors in the airport conflict during 
the 1990’s. 
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2.2 Chewing My Way into the Field 
Through my supervisor, Tobias Hagmann, I got in touch with Dr. Mustafa, a man who soon 
after my arrival became my ‘gatekeeper’, ‘key informant’, ‘interpreter’, ‘fixer’, and friend. Dr. 
Mustafa is a doctor, intellectual, part-time politician, and most importantly to me: a man who 
knows many people. Furthermore, his affiliation with the Garhajis clan, which played a central 
part in the airport history also opened up doors to hear stories from people from this 
particularly clan, which as I will show later played a central role in the airports history (see 3.3). 
Dr. Mustafa’s multi-function made me attentive to find other ‘key informants’ and other ways 
of getting access. I thus found it important to diversify my research and the friendly director 
of IPCS, Adam Haji Ali, was very willing to help me arrange interviews as well. 
Soon after my arrival in Hargeisa, Dr. Mustafa invited me over for a ‘khat session’. In 
Somaliland, chewing khat is for many (exclusively men as I experienced) part of everyday life 
and has been so for hundreds of years (Ezekiel Gebissa, 2010: 608). Khat is a narcotic leave 
and chewing it is a daily, social activity. This means that people sit together and discuss various 
small and large problems or share everyday anecdotes in informal settings. To me khat was a 
constructive way to get both into the field (meet relevant people) and to participate in everyday 
practices with some of my informants. Dr. Mustafa introduced me to a variety of people who 
came by his house for the ‘khat sessions’. In addition, I was invited to chew in a ‘chewing 
house’ hosting various elders and other high-rank clan members for chewing sessions. 
I did not plan to use ‘khat chewing’ as a method before I arrived in Hargeisa, however, I 
quickly realised that it was a fast and constructive way to ‘hang out’ and meet people in my 
particular ‘field’. I consider the chewing khat as one of the methods through which I was able 
to conduct participant observation. I therefore see participant observation as a multiplicity of 
practices, conducts, and methods, which together make up the way one seek to produce data 
and gain knowledge on how people understand their world. In the words of Barth, the 
participant observer “(…) learn the daily life in an unfamiliar place, meaning the fundamental sides of a 
society and culture by participating in a particular place” (1980: 4 [author’s translation]). Barth 
continues “(…) most importantly: it is by attempting to participate that people begin to treat you as a fellow 
human being, people will trust you and open up to you, and most importantly pass on their own concepts, 
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categories and perceptions” (Ibid: 5 [author’s translation]). Participant observation was in this sense 
constantly present in my fieldwork, as I kept exploring ‘the field’. Chewing khat should thus 
be seen as a one of the methods out of a the panoply of methods, which enabled me to attempt 
to participate, learn about the world through the eyes of fellow chewers as well as a way of 
meeting relevant people. 
Peter Hansen is a scholar who has been doing fieldwork in Somaliland and Somalia for a 
number of years. Hansen has described some positive effects of chewing khat for the 
fieldworker, and he has – like me – experienced that “(…) chewing together builds trust and 
interpersonal relations.” (2010: 591).  By sitting with various Somalilanders in these informal 
settings, I literally chewed my way into the field of Garhajis and Edagalle clan members as well 
as ministries.  As one of the effects of khat is that it will make people talk it is a productive 
way of making people talk for a longer period of time (normally around five or six hours). 
Chewing khat is by no means an activity 
practiced by all Somalilanders as I 
ignorantly thought before my arrival. Most 
of the students I met at UoH  told me that 
they disliked chewing khat or that they 
never tried chewing because of the 
potentially negative consequences of 
chewing (stigmatisation, addiction and 
because it is expensive).  
Through the khat sessions, I met various 
people who would stop by to join in. 
Often, my presence would lead to 
questions on who I was and what I was 
doing in Hargeisa. After presenting my 
research topic, and myself, we often 
started discussions based on the research matters and other chewers would think of people I 
could potentially meet. Thus, chewing khat was both a way of chatting informally with other 
Tea & khat: methodological tools (author’s picture)  
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chewers about the airport, as well as a way of meeting people who could help me set up 
relevant interviews. The following excerpt from my field diary exemplifies how the khat 
sessions functioned as a way of gaining access, and the need to be flexible and improvise when 
I got the opportunity: 
After lunch at Casablanca, we went to a ‘chewing house’ where various influential people and 
intellectuals meet and discuss politics, as Dr. Mustafa told me. (…) After half an hour of 
talking, chewing and a lot of phone calls, Dr. Mustafa told me that the minister had time for 
a short interview if I could meet him at the Airport VIP lounge. Mohammed, the kind owner 
of the house and Casablanca, arranged a car for me and all of a sudden, I was on my way to 
conduct an interview with Somaliland’s Minister of Interior. I emptied my tea cup, changed from 
ma’awiis [Somali skirt] to pants and was ready to go5. 
My position as a ‘novice chewer’ created a milieu in which it became natural for me to ask the 
more experienced chewers various questions. Chewing includes a range of other practices such 
as wearing the correct clothes and drinking ones favourite soft drink. The various effects of 
chewing even has its own vocabulary. Therefore, I had the opportunity to make conversations 
by mixing questions to the surrounding khat chewing practices of with questions regarding 
my research topic. I limited my chewing activities to once or twice a week, both because my 
body was not accustomed to chewing and to stand back from these ‘organic recordings’6 to 
analyse and reflect on my experiences. 
 
2.3 Getting Access through the University 
Staying at UoH’s guesthouse helped me in different ways, as mentioned above. Firstly, I was 
never alone. Most of the time I had international teachers, academics, and scholars around me 
at the house. Without their company, my stay would definitely have been less pleasant: 
emotions should not be underestimated when conducting fieldwork (see Sherryl Kleinmann 
& Martha A. Copp, 1993: 1 - 67). Secondly, and maybe more importantly, my affiliation with 
the university provided me with an ‘excuse’ – or reason – to hang around the campus area and 
start random conversations. However, I never actually needed to start a conversation. Simply 
sitting at the ‘cafeteria’ and drink Somali tea would more than often attract attention. Students 
                                                 
5 Translated excerpt from field diary, April 21, 2014 
6 Term from Raymond Madden, 2010: 19 
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would typically address me with curious questions as where I was from and why I was in 
Somaliland (and of course give me the obligatory warm welcome). Furthermore, I also 
attended some of the lectures offered by the IPCS and through the institute I was invited to 
participate in various conferences, seminars, and workshops around Hargeisa. The content of 
these conferences were of various kinds most importantly to me the conferences gave me the 
opportunity to meet various elitist people such as intellectuals, civil society organisers, 
journalists, and politicians. Thus, the conferences breaks became a subtle way of discussing 
various Somaliland matters and a way for me to meet people who could help me in my research 
endeavours. 
My position as a visiting student at the university, thus, provided many opportunities. I had 
the feeling that the students liked the idea that an international student visited their university. 
However, it also meant that I mainly spoke with people from the university and people 
attending the conferences, what could be called the elite and experts of Hargeisa. If I had 
stayed with a Somali family and not been affiliated with the university it would have been more 
difficult for me to meet the elite. Instead, my dissertation would most likely have had a 
different angel: i.e. the view of the people living around the airport and their experiences with 
the airport’s transformation. 
 
2.3 Elite Settings & Elite and Expert Interviews 
As I moved into the field, I identified various relevant ministries I was interested in getting 
into contact with i.e. the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport 
(MCAAT), the Ministry of Trade & Investment (MTI), the airport management, and certain 
Edagalle and Garhajis elders. Prior to my departure, I planned to get in contact with the 
MCAAT; however, it was not until I came to Hargeisa that I was able to identify, more 
concretely, who I could meet. For instance, the minister of MCAAT was in Turkey to discuss 
the management of Somaliland’s airspace with the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia (TFG)7. However, I was able to meet the general director and the minister’s secretary.  
                                                 
7 Because Somalia did not have a functioning central government, Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somlia 
(CACAS), an ICAO produced organ, governed the airspace over Somalia (including Somaliland) from 1996 to 2013. In 
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Dr. Mustafa knew people or knew people who knew people (as described above) from various 
official sectors and ministries. He helped me set up a range of interviews. The bulk of 
interviews were elite and expert interviews what could be called ‘studying up’ as coined by 
Laura Nader (1972). By elite, I refer to people who due to their professional position directly 
influence the management and future transformation of the airport (airport management, staff 
from MCAAT and ministers). The expert interviews were conducted with intellectuals, 
academics, and journalists all of whom had special insight into either the history of the airport, 
the current renovation and security projects, or the day-to-day management. As I often felt it 
was more acceptable to ask naïve questions at the expert interviews these were different from 
elite interviews. The relation between me as researcher and him (except one they were all men) 
as expert, created an atmosphere where asking questions was more acceptable compared to 
when I conducted elite interviews. In the elite interview, I often felt more as ‘the interrogator’ 
and the interviewee as ‘the defender’, thus creating a less ‘everyday’-type of conversation. In 
the following, I will concretise what I did prior to and during the interview situation. 
 
2.3.1 Interview Guides & Interview Techniques 
Doing elite and expert interviews have certain methodological implications as Nader 
eloquently explains in her text (Ibid). For instance the type of interviews I conducted with 
personnel from ministries was often much more formal than with non-elitist people. One of 
my first experiences was that the setting shapes the type of interview to a high degree. Some 
interviews were conducted in Ministry offices, others at hotel restaurants, one at the Airport 
VIP lounge, and one in the back of a worn out Toyota. The atmosphere and varying formality 
of the interviews changed my interview technique depending on the dynamic between the  
interviewee and me. 
His name was displayed on the nameplate on his desk next to the small Somaliland flag. We 
talked about his trip to Turkey and why he was there. I started by asking fact-questions: 
“Firstly, I would like to know who the main investors are in the current airport improvements?” 
Mr. Omar Aden shortly said: “you forgot your recorder!” Although I didn’t plan to record the 
                                                 
2013, the responsibility of governing the airspace over Somalia was transferred from CACAS to the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia. A change the Somaliland government did not approve of, the two governments have recently 
negotiated on how to possibly share the responsibility to govern the airspace over Somaliland territory 
(somalilandsun.com, 2014) 
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interview, I slightly embarrassed found my dictaphone on the bottom of my backpack, turned it 
on, and took a long bewildered look at my interview guide8 
The example above clearly shows how my expectation to the interview situation was 
different from the expectations of my informant. In a later interview with the airport 
manager I laid my dictaphone on his office table and asked if I could record the interview. 
He kindly declined and said he would prefer no recordings as he felt his English was too 
poor to be recorded9. I therefor had to be flexible and readjust to the situation. 
As mentioned above the interviewee and the setting influenced the interview process. Thus, I 
needed to be flexible and re-think the interview situation as the interview proceeded. Often 
the elite interviewees expected a formal interview situation as the excerpt from my field notes 
above illustrates. This relates to what Olivier De Sardan points out: “[interview] proceedings 
obviously depend on the strategies of both (or all) of the partners in the interaction, on cognitive resources, and 
on the context in which it is situated” (2008: 16). This means that a number of factors such as the 
chemistry and interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee come into play when 
conducting interviews. What I found most important, as a guiding principle was to be flexible 
and innovative while keeping focus on the themes of my research. One of the concrete 
techniques I used was presenting narratives - or specific aspects of certain events – from my 
previous interviews and the knowledge I had acquired from my daily interactions in Hargeisa 
with other informants. I did so to start a discussion and to create a dialogical space, in which 
the interviewee, or informant, could tell his or her story, and thus diversify or give his consent 
to the stories presented. Thus, the interviews had a thematic structure while leaving time and 
space for the interview to go into other undiscovered but relevant directions. In general, the 
historical events were often the starting point of my interviews as it started the conversation 
by clarifying specific events which could lead to other relevant topics.  This techniques was 
especially useful when interviewing about historical events. 
 
                                                 
8 Translated excerpt from field diary, March 3, 2014 
9 Field notes, April 20, 2014 
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2.3.2 Time & Access 
Much of my daily activity in was occupied with setting up interviews and gaining access. Often 
it was difficult to get a hold of relevant people in the relevant ministries. Sometimes, the 
interviewee did not show up, sometimes he/she came late, and at times practicalities came in 
the way. For instance, I made an appointment with an elder from the parliament (the House 
of Guurti). However, when I approached the gate to the ‘House of Guurti’ I was not allowed 
to enter as the government had announced a collective prayer day to put an end to the 
seemingly endless drought, and all official offices were closed for the day10. At times, these 
various factors made it at times difficult for me to carry out the interviews I intended to and  
therefore I did not carry out all of the interviews I intended to. However, the amount of time 
I had compared to research proposal is a concern any researcher should consider and confront. 
Before my fieldtrip, I felt that the seven weeks stay in Hargeisa would provide enough time to 
conduct 10 to 20 interviews, visit the airport, and still let the fieldwork design process be open-
ended. 
Soon after my arrival I realised that the particular field topic was, and is, a political sensitive 
issue. The airport renovation and security projects have been subject to various corruption 
allegations in Somaliland newspapers. This had very concrete consequences for my first 
attempts to get in contact with the MCAAT. The first few times I went to the MCAAT office 
I was met by a sceptical attitude. My immediate thought was that the personnel from the 
ministry were suspecting me of being a nosy journalist. First, I was frustrated later I realised 
that the failure of my first attempts is a normal condition as getting accesses to elite settings 
can be more time consuming than in non-elite settings (Rosanna Hertz & Jonathan B. Imber, 
1993: 3; Theophilus Gokah, 2006: 66 – 67).  Secondly, I believe that one of the reasons for 
the first failed attempts were mainly because I did not present my topic and research aim in a 
proper and fulfilling way, which is an immensely important ethical feature when conducting 
interviews (see i.e.: Regina Scheyrens, Barbara Nowak and Henry Scheyvens, 2003: 142). This 
illustrates that doing fieldwork and conducting interviews is largely a matter of practice, as the 
quote from the top of this chapter insinuates. 
                                                 
10 Journal, April 26, 2014 
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When the time of my departure from Hargeisa was approaching, I felt that I could have stayed 
double the amount of time to keep researching. However, I agree with George E. Marcus and 
Judith Okely when they argue that the field will never be investigated fully therefore 
researchers should not use an apology of incompleteness (2007: 355 - 357). Instead, I 
acknowledge that the data and material I produced will show certain things and hide others. 
Thus, the knowledge of the present dissertation can never be said to be holistic. However, I 
do not view the ‘partial knowledge’ of my data as incomplete data. I kept striving towards 
covering as much as I could while being aware of the various limitations as described above. 
Thus, my material is a sum of various factors created in a certain time. 
 
2.4 Secondary Material 
Besides the first hand material described above I have gathered a range of documents, UN 
updates, governmental papers, and the like. The literature on the Somaliland history will also 
be utilised to compare, substantiate, and discuss these in relation to the data I produced during 
my fieldwork. 
Most relevantly to the airport is Renders’ chapter on the ‘airport war’ from her Ph.D. 
dissertation called: “‘Traditional’ leaders and institutions in the building of the Muslim republic 
of Somaliland” (2006). This is one of the few in-depth accounts of the civil war in the mid 
90’s including how it relates to the airport. Beside her thesis, I will make use of updates from  
Africa Watch and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Especially Matt 
Bryden and Patrick Gilkes who worked for UNDP as observers have produced a range of 
updates where dynamics from Hargeisa Airport. I will make use of the updates to unfold the 
history of the airport. These updates all together cover the period from the late 80’s to the mid 
90’s. Furthermore, I was able to gather a few official governmental documents through 
desktop research, which will complement my interview transcripts and field notes. These 
documents represent the official viewpoints of the Government of Somaliland and the various 
Ministries. In addition, I received two papers produced by the Academy for Peace and 
Development (APD) as well as some more or less official papers from the ‘House of Guurti’.  
I attempted several times to get hold of documents form the airport management among other 
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things. I was especially interested in figures on the development of passengers, business flows, 
and the like; however, I was never successful in doing so. 
Lastly, it is important to mention that my production of field materials did not end when I 
flew out of Hargeisa. After my return to Copenhagen, I stayed in contact with three key 
informants who kindly clarified and verified certain aspects. 
 
2.5 Data Processing 
As I started to identify various events and the dynamics of these, I refined my interview guides. 
In this way, the first data served as foundation for further data production and analysis (see 
also Juliet Corbin & Anselm Strauss, 2008: 163). The data production (elite interviews, 
participant observation, and other’s materials) and the data processing (field note writing and 
categorisation) was therefore produced via an interactive process. This means that the 
production of data and processing of data cannot be clearly separated (see Steven J. Taylor & 
Robert Bogdan, 1984: 128 – 129). In concrete terms, I kept a daily field diary, notes during 
interviews that I would transcribe later, and wrote various types of short jotting during the day 
that I later elaborated by writing them into longer passages in my field notes (See Roger Sanjek 
1990: pp. 94 – 121 for a vocabulary of field notes). Then I processed the experiences and 
knowledge I had acquired in a different document, which again could update my interview-
guide in the light of relevant findings. However, it was not until I returned to Copenhagen I 
systematically started to conceptualise and thematise the interviews transcripts, field notes, my 
field diary and all the other types of data I had produced. 
I have categorised the data and searched for crosscutting tendencies and patterns. For instance, 
I created a category called ‘airport dreams’. This category consists of transcript from various 
interviews and documents from the Somaliland Government and Ministries. Furthermore, 
one quote can fit into several categories. The purpose of this is to search for common 
tendencies or incongruences among informants and in other types of data. 
I would like to underline that the process of data analysis has created certain reflections, as 
well as confusion, which have led me to return to the data to re-read and re-process the data. 
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Thus, the data analysis and data process have been a parallel and ongoing process. In my view, 
the question that occurs is; when to stop? A question I do not think I can answer here. Instead, 
I will end this section by stating that the data is alive throughout the process of researching 
moreover data production, processing, and analysis can never be said to have a fixed end. 
This concludes the methodological outline, and I will proceed by beginning the analysis with 
the airport’s role in the broader state formation processes.  
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Chapter III: The Birth, Death & Re-birth of Hargeisa Airport: 
From Colonial Interests to the Making of a Regional Trade 
Hub 
This first analytical chapter will uncover the history and changing roles of Hargeisa Egal 
International Airport (HGA). Here I will demonstrate how the airport has been a central arena 
wherefrom one can gain insight into Somaliland’s history. Furthermore, I will show that its 
functions and practices have been constantly changing in relation to broader state formation 
processes. I will present the history and functioning of the airport through the prisms of four 
key events, which have been central to the shaping of state formation in Somaliland over the 
years. By unfolding the history of Hargeisa Airport, this chapter will analyse how it went from 
being an airport serving the colonial rulers to a place where Somaliland can represent itself as 
a sovereign state. 
The first prism will focus on the airport and its functions during the British colonial rule. The 
second prism illustrates the transformation of the airport in the years after the unification with 
the former Italian Somaliland in 1960. The third prism zooms in on ‘the airport war’, during 
which the Edagalle clan and the Somaliland government disputed over the ownership of 
Hargeisa Airport. Lastly, the fourth prism focusses on the last ten years of renovations, 
improvements and general proffesionalisations of the airport, which should be seen as part of 
the strategy for creating a regional trade hub in the Horn of Africa. 
 
3.1 Prism 1: The Birth of Hargeisa Airport 
Little has been written about Hargeisa Airport during colonial times, which in itself indicate 
its little relevance during colonial times. A plaque in the arrival terminal at HGA suggests that 
the Duke of Gloucester officially inaugurated the main building 18th of November 195811.  
However, there had been aerial activities prior to this date. The plague was originally put up 
in the old airport buildings which today is a ruin south of the runway. Today, the arrival and 
                                                 
11 Field notes, April 27, 2014 
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departure terminals lie on the northern side of the runway12. It is not completely clear when 
the airport was built, but according to the Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport 
(MCAAT) it is thought constructed in the years of World War II (Ministry of Civil Aviation 
& Air Transport, 2012). According to the Minister of Trade & Investments Mr. Mohamed 
Omar, the airport was constructed to serve the interests of the British colonial administration, 
who needed a fast way to move from Hargeisa to Aden in Yemen13. The British interests in 
Hargeisa and Somaliland were minimal compared to the port city of Aden, which was an 
important transit port and served as a stopover point on the colonisers’ way to India (Ibid). 
Aden, however, had few local resources and the British colonial garrison and administration 
were dependent on meat from Somaliland, which was a relatively large producer of livestock 
(Lewis, 1980: 40).  The western part of Somaliland, where Hargeisa is situated, is the 
agricultural region and during the colonial times Hargeisa was (and still is) one of the main 
trading cities in the region (Lewis, 1961: Ch. 4; Samatar, 1989:Ch. 3)14. Thus, the main interests 
of the British protectorate in Somaliland was to get meat and agricultural products from the 
west of Somaliland (including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia) to Aden. The narrow interest 
in meat is also reflected in the lack of infrastructural priorities in British Somaliland at the time 
as they created one road that stretched from the airport around Hargeisa city to the Berbera 
port in the north15. 
The minimal British interest in Somaliland made a difference regarding the type of rule 
practiced by the British ‘Protectorate’ compared to other colonial territories.  Prunier has 
categorised the type of rule as ‘no-government’, and argues, that the political ethos of the 
British rulers can be characterised as a benign type of rule, whereas in the Italian Somaliland 
the Italian administration ruled in a much more direct centralised way  (2012: 45 - 47). 
However, some Somali scholars have rejected this interpretation of the British colonial rule, 
and argued that the colonial powers affected the political structures in very concrete ways 
(Samatar, 1989: 44 – 45; Höhne, 2006a). These scholars argue that British colonisers  
strategically made use of already established clan structures and power channels to keep the 
                                                 
12 Field notes, March 23 and April 27, 2014 
13 Interview w. Mr. Mohamed Omar, Minister of Trade & Investments, March 6, 2014 
14 After Berbera was destroyed in the early 40’s the British administration changed the capital from Berbera to Hargeisa,  
simply because the state buildings in Berbera had been destroyed (Samatar, 1989: 59) 
15 Field notes, April 23, 2014 
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local population from revolting against the colonisers. In practice, the colonial administration 
paid off local clan leaders and integrated some of these into the colonial administration 
(Höhne, 2006a: 6 - 10). 
The function of Hargeisa Airport at the time show that the airport was created to serve the 
type of mobility required by the colonisers: a fast way of getting from Aden in Yemen to  
Hargeisa. Thus, the dynamics and rationale of the British rule is mirrored in the airport 
function and narrow purpose of opening the airport. 
 
3.2 Prism II: The Making of a Military Airport 
The colonial rule ended and Somaliland was granted independence on June 26, 1960. Five 
days later the former British Somaliland and the former Italian Somaliland united and created 
the Somali Republic (Samatar, 1986: 79; Lewis, 1980: 161). Soon after the unification the 
Somalilanders – or the Northern Somalis – especially the people from the Isaaq clan, became 
increasingly marginalised (Bradbury 2008: 58 - 60). The Somali government centralised state 
institutions in the capital of Mogadishu in the 60’s. These ‘centralisation dynamics’ also 
become evident when looking at Hargeisa Airport in this period. According to Ibrahim, a 
politician I met at an afternoon khat session, several airports closed in the early years of the 
Somali Republic. Hargeisa Airport was not closed but all international flights ceased to service 
Hargeisa. In fact, the airport started to operate solely as a domestic airport in the mid 1960’s16.  
International flights were now strictly operating from Mogadishu and Berbera, the second 
largest city in the North. Instead, Hargeisa Airport began to serve as a connection point 
between the main city in the north and the central administration in Mogadishu17. However, 
this did not mean that the airport became less important for the Somali government. Rather, 
its function transformed and became a vital and strategic military base for the Somali National 
Army in the ‘Ogaden War’, which stated in 1977 (Bradbury, 2008: 38; Lewis, 1980: 231 - 235). 
As it was a vision of the Barré regime to create a ‘Greater Somalia’ the Somali Republic wanted 
                                                 
16 Field notes, March 22, 2014 
17 Interview w. Mr. Mohamed Omar, Minister of Trade and International Investments, March 6 2014 
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to annex the Somali region of Ethiopia; Ogaden, into the new Somali Republic (Gebru Tareke, 
2000: 635). 
When mentioning the Ogaden War, it is important to understand that the vision of the Somali 
state was to unite all Somali people. This included the Somalis living in the northern parts of 
Kenya (the Northern Frontier District, called NFD), Djibouti (until 1977 known as The 
French Territory of the Afars and the Issas), an eastern region of Ethiopia (Ogaden), and 
British and Italian Somaliland (John Drysdale, 1964). These five Somali regions are symbolised 
through the five-points of the star in the Somali flag. As the airport is situated only 90 
kilometres from the Ethiopian border it was an important strategic position for the Somali 
military and played a significant role in the ‘Ogaden War’ 18 19. 
After the Somali Republic lost the Ogaden War in 1978, the president Siyad Barré’s popularity 
started to vanish. According to Gilkes, a long-time observer of political affairs in the Horn of 
Africa the northern officers blamed Barré and Southern interests for being too greedy (1993: 
4). Conflicts between the central administration and the Isaaq people from the north of 
Somalia escalated up through the 1980’s; goods were confiscated at Berbera port and khat 
farms in what today is Somaliland were burned down (Bradbury, 2008: 59).  According to 
Kapteijns, the Barré regime declared economic warfare against the Isaaq clan in 1981 (2013: 
84 – 85). Isaaq politicians were imprisoned without being charged or sentenced and the Isaaq 
elite fled the country creating diasporas around the globe (Ibid; Renders, 2012: 59 - 60). The 
repression of the Northern Isaaq people is boldly evident in the downplaying of the airport, 
and the war-ridden period had concrete effect on the airport function as it was transformed 
into a military base. 
More radically, the Barré regime systematically targeted elders and military personnel from the 
Isaaq clan (Robert Gersony, 1989: 60 – 61). As a result, Isaaq affiliated military personnel and 
elders were executed for being traitors of the Somali Republic20. According to ‘Warabe’, a 
highly respected elder I interviewed one afternoon in Hargeisa, the Somali National Army 
                                                 
18 Field notes, March 22, 2014 
19 Ogaden became Ethiopian in 1884 after the ‘Berlin Conference’ (Email correspondence w. Dr. Mustafa, September 19,  
2014) 
20 Interview w. Haji Abdi Warabe, member of Guurti House, April 26 2014. 
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repressed Isaaq elders and military because Barré was afraid of the strength of the northern 
military, which mainly consisted of Isaaq clan members. My talk with ‘Warabe’ underpin 
Bradbury’s observation in the sense that Warabe recounted that the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) was formed as a consequence of the refugees from Ogaden (and Oromo) 
who moved to what is today Somaliland and were appropriated land and jobs(2008: 55)21. The 
refugees from Ogaden were recruited by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) to help 
the Somalia National army to force out Isaaq from the Northern regions (Konrad Van 
Brabant, 1994: 11 - 13). The Isaaq people, thus, felt further marginalised and that their 
livelihood were threatened. 
The SNM had operated in the rural areas of Northern Somalia (today’s Somaliland) in the 
early 1980s. However, it was not before the attack on Burao and Hargeisa in 1988 that the 
SNM made an extensive attack on cities (Africa Watch, 1990: 127 – 149). One of the main 
targets was Hargeisa airport as it was one the main military bases (Gilkes, 1989: 55). The 
airport is once again a window through 
which one can observe the broader state 
dynamics, which at the time consisted of 
repressions and resistance, and the airport 
was a central arena for warfare that marked 
this particular juncture of Somalilands state 
formation processes. 
The 1988 attacks on Burao and Hargeisa 
stand today as defining events in 
Somaliland history. Although the SNM-led 
attacks failed to take over the control of 
Barre controlled military positions, it 
remains a ‘point of no return’ in the 
narrative about the creation of Somaliland 
as a self-claimed sovereign state. On the 
                                                 
21 Ibid 
A Symbol of Somaliland Liberation (Authors Picture) 
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ground, SNM took control of Burao and Hargeisa, and it took the Somali National Army 
several weeks22 to recover and re-launch an attack (Bradbury, 2008:60 – 63). The Somali 
National Army launched its attack from the airport, and began to bomb Hargeisa to force out 
SNM troops. In a briefing from 1989, Gilkes reported that the devastating attacks resulted in 
approximately 50.000 casualties, while 400.000 Somalis fled from Hargeisa (mainly to 
Ethiopia), and 1.5 million people were displaced (Gilkes, 1989: 55). These bombardments 
stand as a pivotal event in the Somaliland history. Today, on the main street in downtown 
Hargeisa a Somali MIG fighter, used to bombard the city in 1989, is displayed as a national 
monument to commemorate the attacks on Hargeisa. 
Thus, the airport is today a central part of the national narrative. On one side of the monument 
the destruction of Hargeisa is displayed on the other side the liberation and (re)birth of 
Somaliland is portrayed. In this way, the monument with the airplane on top tells the story of 
how Somaliland was bombed and out of this re-born and placing the airport in the centre of 
the narrative. 
 
3.3: Prims III: The ‘Airport War’ & the Creation of Hargeisa Egal 
International Airport 
I will now proceed to the so-called ‘airport war’, which was another important turning point 
in history of Somaliland’s state formation. The ‘airport war’ evolved into a civil war that lasted 
from 1994 to 1997. This period stands as the most violent period in the history of the ‘new’ 
Somaliland. After years of struggling between SNM (along with other liberation movements 
across the Somali republic23) and the Somali National Army, the Barre regime fell in 1991, and 
Somaliland was (re)born. Parts of the SNM went to the airport to celebrate the liberation24. 
On August 27 1994, President Egal closed Hargeisa Airport and announced that the airports in 
Berbera and Boroma and a small strip in Kalabaydh should be used instead (Gilkes 1995: 46). 
This statement, announced through Radio Hargeisa, marked the beginning of the ‘Airport War’ 
                                                 
22 From June 31 to August 11, to be precise (Email correspondence w. Dr. Mustafa, September 19, 2014)  
23 See Daniel Compagnon (1998) for a scrutiny of armed movements in Somalia in the late 1980’s 
24 Field notes, March 23, 2014 
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(Renders, 2006: p. 257 - 279). The closure of Hargeisa Airport came after months of negotiations 
between the government and the elders from the Edagalle clan, who negotiated on behalf of the 
so-called ‘third brigade’ which was a faction of the dissolved SNM, which was primarily made up 
by Edagalle clan members (Renders, 2012: 128). President Egal sought to nationalise and 
institutionalise various all-important revenue generators in order for the central administration to 
obtain tax income and through this finance the attempts to securitise and stabilise the young 
Somaliland state. This was not possible at the airport as the ‘third brigade’, with General Jama 
Mohamed Ghalib as spearhead, had controlled the airport and collected tax since the collapse of 
the Barrè regime and the ‘third brigade’ were reluctant to give up the airport to the government25. 
The conflicts over who should control the airport escalated in 1994 and turned into a civil war 
when the Garhajis clan got involved in the airport war. I will return to different versions of why 
they became involve below (see section 3.3.2) 
A United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) report from 2002 shows that the 
‘Airport War’ resulted in 90.000 new registered refugees in Ethiopia (Guido Ambrose, 2002: 7). 
The exact numbers of casualties and refugees are, however, difficult to estimate (Renders, 2006: 
275). Although the actual fighting ended in July 1996, the ‘Hargeisa Conference’ in 1997 
officially ended the civil war after months of conflict resolutions (Bradbury, 2008: 127). The 
conference resulted in the two parties, with Garhajis on the one side and President Egal and 
the Government on the other, settling a deal that included the re-election of President 
Mohamed Egal, and further integration of Garhajis clan members in ministries and in the 
police force26. Furthermore, the airport became a national property and went from being a 
clan-controlled institution to a state institution. The airport was re-named, and from 1997 
onwards, it has been known as Hargeisa Egal International Airport, which illustrates well the 
consolidation of the state. It is necessary to understand the political context at the time to 
understand the different version of why the Garhajis clan got involved in the ‘Airport War’ 
that escalated into civil war hereafter. 
 
                                                 
25 Email correspondence w. Dr. Mustafa, September 19, 2014 
26 Interview w. Abdi, local scholar, March, 2014 (I have decided to anonymise his identity) 
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3.3.1 Political Context 
After a series of peace conferences in the beginning of the 1990’s, elders and intellectuals came 
together, negotiated and decided to create an independent Somaliland republic (Academy for 
Peace & Development, 2008). The first two years, from 1991 to 1993 was a so-called transition 
period with a SNM leadership, of which the late SNM leader Abdirahman ‘Tuur’ was the head 
of state. In the ‘Boroma Conference’ in 1993, after the transition years ended, Mohamed Egal, 
the former Prime Minister of the Somali Republic was nominated as president of Somaliland 
(Bradbury, 2008: 109 - 110). In Mohamed Egal’s first term as president of Somaliland27, one of 
the Somaliland government’s primary tasks was to demobilise clan militias and to bring important 
tax revenue generators under government control. 
In the years before Egal, the ‘Tuur’ administration had problems controlling the Berbera Port 
during its leadership from 1991 to 1993 (Renders, 2006: 259). However, the ‘Sheekh 
conference’28 in 1992 resolved the Berbera Port problem, the conference created a set of 
principles for resolving future conflict of similar character (Academy for Peace & Development, 
2008: 45 – 54, see also Mohamed Abdirahman Abdillahi et al., 2013: 9). As a follow up on the 
‘Sheekh Conference’, the ‘Borama Conference’ in 1993 consolidated the principles and created a 
peace charter called the ‘Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter’ (Academy for 
Peace & Development, 2008: 52). According to the Academy for Peace and Development 
(APD), one of the key provisions in the charter was that: “[e]ach community would take responsibility 
for the actions of bandits (…) in their territories, each would establish a security council to oversee law and order, 
and a clan-based police force was to be created (…)” (Ibid, 2008: 50). Furthermore, it was agreed that tax 
revenue generators such as the Berbera Port was now national property. Thus, when Mohamed 
Egal took over power in 1993 he had the authority of the port in Berbera and the most important 
road toll in Somaliland29. However, the airport in Hargeisa was still under the control of the 
aforementioned ‘third brigade’, and this one of the reasons that spurred violent fighting in the 
airport area south of Hargeisa in 1994. 
                                                 
27 It was the second time he was head of Somaliland - he was the prime minister when Somaliland was independent for five 
days in the summer 1960 (Lewis, 1980: 163 - 165). 
28 The conferences were established by elders and the SNM Committee (Academy for Peace & Development, 2008: 10)  
29 The road toll is in Kalabayd, a town 70 kilometres from Hargeisa close to the Ethiopian border, a toll where trucks 
loaded with khat pass every day  
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3.3.2 A Contested History: Various Versions of the ‘Airport War’ 
There exists various interpretations of the ‘Airport War’ and the conflict is still a potent subject 
in Somaliland today. Before an interview I had with Mr. Adbrihaman Awa Ali Farah, the former 
Vice President of Somaliland as well as former Minister of Defence he told me: “I do not like 
your topic – it is a conflict we should not keep repeating. It was bad, we should move on”30. This indicates 
that the airport war and following civil war is still a delicate matter and a period some people 
prefer to forget. 
When Egal, member of the Habar Awal clan, was nominated as president in 1993, he won the 
presidency against Abdirahman Tuur who was from the Garhajis clan. According to Abdi, a 
scholar I interviewed in Hargeisa, the fact that the two candidates were from different clans is 
very important in order to understand the dynamic of the ‘Airport War’31. He elaborated on the 
complexity of the conflict by stating that it started as a clan conflict due to conflicting economic 
interests but developed into a political conflict32. The scholar explained how the ‘Airport War’ 
was a political conflict as Garhajis clan-members saw Egal’s and thereby his clan Habar Awal’s 
control of revenue generators as a threat to the Garhajis and Edagalle clan’s position. Gilkes 
(1995: 6), an observer of the conflict notes that: “[f]or the Eidagalle, Hargeisa airport belongs to the clan 
in a way that Boroma airport belongs to the Gadabuursi or Berbera to the Isa Muse/Habr Awal33. It was, and 
is, a potential, if not necessarily, clan resource”. Renders similarly argues that the ‘Airport War’ started 
as a fight over economic resources between the ‘third brigade’ and the government (2006: 260). 
She continues by stating that the Garhajis elders eventually started to support the ‘third brigade’ 
as they felt politically marginalised under the new Egal government (Ibid). 
Some observers of Somaliland at the time stated that the conflict between the Egal government 
and the Edagalle clan triggered conflicts in different parts of Somaliland and eventually led to the 
civil war from 1994 to 1997 in Somaliland (Bryden, 1994b; Gilkes, 95). The main explanations in 
the UN updates at the time on the ‘Airport War’ suggest that the conflict was rooted in the ‘third 
                                                 
30 Interview w. Adbrihaman Awa Ali Farah April 20, 2014 
31 Interview w. Abdi, local scholar, 2014  
32 Ibid 
33 Habr Awal and Habar Awal refers to the same clan, the difference is only a matter of spelling. 
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brigade’s’ unwillingness to hand over the airport control to the Somaliland government (Ibid). 
The Garhajis clan members I spoke with stated that the violence actually started in Burao and 
not Hargeisa34. From their point of view, the problem was the way in which the government 
took control of the airport, which they said was in opposition to the Peace Charter from 199335. 
They elaborated and referred to the point that one of the main principles of the peace charter  
that made it clear that the government of Somaliland did not have the authority to take over 
property with force; rather, the conflicts should be solved in the respective territories by the clans. 
This breach on the Peace Charter was, according to many Garhajis, the main reason why the 
‘third brigade’ militia received support from their Garhajis clansmen. 
In an interview in 1994 with the local observer Matt Bryden, President Mohamed Egal stated 
that the government control of the airport was important in regard to demobilising militia: 
We are now in the process of demobilizing the militia, in evicting them from Hargeisa airport 
and returning it to the hands of the government (…) [w]e are very much handicapped by lack 
of resources, but my government has to establish itself as being completely in control of the country 
before we can embark upon an international campaign for recognition (Bryden, 1994a: 42). 
The quote shows that the airport war was not only a struggle over control of an important 
resource of revenues, but also a part of making Somaliland a recognised state. According to 
Egal, the Somaliland state needed to show that it was in control of its territory and controlling 
its infrastructure to become a recognised state. Dominik Balthasar underlines this by arguing  
in his article on the Somaliland state formation, that Egal shrewdly instigated civil wars to 
consolidate the state (2013: 231). 
 
3.3.3 ‘The Airport War’ & State Formation 
The ‘airport war’ that had escalated into civil war ended in 1997 after a series of peace 
conferences. The peace process serves as a good example of the ‘Somaliland way’ of peace 
building. The elders, sheiks and sultans I spoke with told me that peace negotiations can be 
formal – but they far from always are. They can be organised by the ‘House of Guurti’ or by 
                                                 
34 Field notes, March 22, March 23 and April 28 2014; Interview w. Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Minister of Interior, April 
21 2014 
35 Ibid 
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elders in local communities. Sometimes informal meetings develop into ‘formal’ negotiations 
or conferences – often they do not. One thing seems to be clear from my inquiries: clan 
negotiations happen in changing arenas, parallel to other negotiations and with changing actors 
depending on the topic and on the development of the negotiations. To be more precise, the 
type of conflict will change the rules, arenas and the involved actors of the negotiation. In a 
proposal of a new analytical framework of the African state, Tobias Hagmann and Didier 
Péclard argue: “Conflicts open up new arenas of negotiation where social actors contest for power and control 
as well as for the definition of statehood in the aftermath of conflict” (2011: 17). These dynamics were 
evident in the aftermath of the airport war as well (and in other historical conflicts as 
demonstrated in this chapter). The Minister of Interior, Ali Mohamed Waran Ade told me that 
he was one of the main mediators in the conflict between the government and the Edagalle 
clan during the civil war. According to the minister, his position as member of the government 
and as member of the Edagalle clan put him in a position where he could step in and mediate36.  
Moreover, he stated that his mediation happened parallel to other mediations as well as official 
peace conferences37. This indicates that negotiation processes in the Somaliland context are 
moulded and remoulded to fit the specific conflict. Making the airport into a site where 
Somaliland can represent itself as a sovereign state has thus been a conflictive journey. 
The fact that the airport transformed from being a clan controlled asset to becoming a 
government controlled institution shows that the ‘airport war’ has to be understood in the 
context of broader state processes at the time. Some say it was a time when clans conflicted 
with the government over the control of economic resources others that the dynamics of the 
war was about governing principles. However, the result was a transformation of the airport 
from militia controlled to being a national property. By naming, the airport after President 
Egal the airport clearly became a national property. Although the airport war stands as the 
most violent period in the history of Somaliland and resulted in many casualties, the result was 
a consolidation of the Somaliland state. 
 
                                                 
36 Interview w. Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Minister of Interior, April 21, 2014 
37 Ibid 
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3.4 Prism IV: The Making of a Regional Trading Hub 
The years after the civil war were much quieter resulting in a steady increase in returnees from 
diasporas and refugee camps (Bradbury, 2008: 160 - 163). The stability also affected the now 
international airport, which saw a 200-fold increase in passenger traffic, from approximately 
1.000 in 1996 to 200.000 in 2011 (Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport, 2012: 2). The 
airport experienced very limited developments and improvement in the years until 2012. 
However, before 2012, the control tower and firefighting equipment were updated and the 
runway was patched. One of the larger projects was the construction of the departure terminal, 
which separated the airport into two buildings one for arrivals and one for departures38 (Ibid).  
Although very little statistics exist on the development of aerial traffic to and from Hargeisa 
airport, it is clear that there has been a significant increase in the traffic in and out of the 
airport. The Ministry of Planning and Development publishes an annual fact-book called 
‘Somaliland in figures’, and in the most recent of these, the following can be read: 
Year Commercial 
Passenger 
Non-Commercial 
Passenger 
Commercial CGO 
PAX 
OUT 
PAX 
OUT 
PAX 
OUT 
PAX 
OUT 
CGO IN 
kg 
CGO out 
kg 
2008 62,617 56,002   2,676,840 216,042 
2009 62,234 55,973   2,872,452 309,533 
2010 95,063 86,596   408,949 37,280 
2011 81,578 78,770 0 0 481,688 2,562 
2012 80440 72090 12795 13686 851554 29965 
(Ministry of National Planning and Development, 2013) 
Today the airport serves more than ten private airline companies, including Daallo Airlines, 
Jubba Airways, African Express, Ethiopian Airlines and Fly-Sax as well as UN flights (Ministry 
of Civil Aviation & Air Transport, 2012: 2). 
 
                                                 
38 interview w. Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Minister of Interior, April 21, 2014 
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3.4.1 The Reformation of HGA: A Development Rationality 
The increasing air traffic can possibly be attributed to the large renovation and security 
projects, which started in 2012 at HGA and Berbera Airport. The projects are expected to 
finish in 2014 (Somalilandsun, 2012a). The aim is to renovate HGA to enable larger airplanes 
to land and depart from the airport, which presumable would increase the flow through 
Hargeisa airport and thereby create economic growth. The outdoor renovation includes 
various projects, such as fencing the airport area, repaving the runway, and extending the 
runway. Furthermore, various internal security projects have been launched i.e. training of 
security staff, instalment of security machines and the like (Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air 
Transport, 2012: 3). The funding of these improvements come from a vast array of donors 
and investors such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (Kuwait Fund) the 
government of the United Kingdom (UK), the Somaliland government and local businessmen 
(I will go more into detail with the funding and the actors in the Chapter IV). The total funding 
amounts to a little less than USD 30 million (Ministry of National Planning & Development, 
2011: 121). 
The renovation and strengthening of airport security should be seen within a broader political 
strategy of the Somaliland government. In the ‘National Development Plan’ (NDP) from 
2011, infrastructural improvements are one of the main pillars in the achievement of economic 
progress and in reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Ministry of National 
Planning & Development, 2011: 1). In addition, the Somaliland government has produced a 
set of visions for Somaliland future in a strategy called ‘National Vision 2030’ (Ibid: 21). The 
strategy corresponds with the NDP and forefronts the infrastructural improvements by 
claiming that: “(…) infrastructure contributes to socio-economic and technological progress and thus is an 
issue of overarching importance to development” (Ibid: 29). The government furthermore envisions a 
“(…) nation interconnected and linked to neighbouring countries through a network of roads, railways, airports 
and seaports” (Ibid: 23). The renovation and security projects at of the airport is thus part of a 
larger development rationality: by attempting to link Hargeisa with regional markets through 
HGA it is the expected that increasing flow will create economic progress. 
I met the Minister of Trade & Investment, Mr Omar Mohamed Omar, in a hotel lobby in 
Hargeisa; he substantiated the economic globalisation strategy. According to him, the aim of 
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creating economic progress through ‘opening up’ to global markets will only happen if 
Hargeisa can locate itself within the aerial infrastructure in East Africa and through this 
become an important transport hub in the Horn of Africa39. He continued by stating that one 
of the important means of doing so is by strengthening the economic connections to the Gulf 
States, primarily the city of Dubai, and by creating a strong and reliable connection to Addis 
Ababa in Ethiopia40. The Director General of the Ministry of Aviation took it a step further 
when he exclaimed that: “Hargeisa is the hub for Somali people. It used to be Djibuiti but now we made 
attraction and renovation and we have successfully become the hub of Somali people”41. Thus, the rationality 
of the strategy is that by creating a strong and reliable airport, Hargeisa will become a part of 
a regional network of airports and thereby become a regional hub that connects the Arab Gulf 
states and the Ethiopian hinterland (see also Financial Times, 2013). 
Thus the current airport dynamics illustrate that Somaliland is increasingly linking with global 
markets, and that the airport is an important tool in the making of a future economic growth.  
 
3.5 Part conclusion: The State as Process 
The history of the airport sheds light upon how the state can be understood by analysing it in 
the margins of the state. The functions of the airport have varied over time depending on 
competing interests between actors within Somaliland and the Somali Republic as well as 
among international actors. As I have shown through the four prisms, the rationales and 
mobility interests of the various rulers of the Somaliland territory have shaped the changing 
airport’s function. Furthermore, I showed that state formation is inherently a conflictual 
process by looking at the airport as an arena were various actors has competed and negotiated 
over the right to control and form it. 
The ruins of the old airport buildings and the remaining of the old colonial route between 
Hargeisa and Berbera show that Somaliland has left behind the colonial era and created their 
own state with its own infrastructure. The MIG fighter monument is even more directly a 
                                                 
39 Interview w. Mr. Mohamed Omar, Minister of Trade & Investments, March 6, 2014 
40 Ibid 
41 Interview w. Mr. Omar Abidallahi Aden, Director General, Ministry of Aviation, March 3, 2014 
42 
 
narration of the break away from the Somali Republic and a reminder of a violent past. After 
the conflicts over the right to control the airport in the early years of Somaliland (re)birth, the 
airport was nationalised and by naming the airport after the President at the time, the 
Somaliland state was clearly consolidated. Today, the creation of a modern international 
airport tells the story of a state seek to enter the global market (whatever that might be) to 
create a future with economic growth. In short, the airport history tells the story of an airport 
that has been recast from being a colonial asset serving the colonial powers to become a state 
asset and a possible upcoming regional trade hub. The airport history shows that the state 
formation is a set of processes that constantly refigure the state. The right to control the airport 
has been disputed which clearly illustrate that the Somaliland state is not a pre-given but rather 
that it has been formed through various historical events into what it is today. 
The main conclusion is that the airport has been a central arena where various actors has 
shaped and reformed Somaliland into what it is today. I will now move onto how the HGA 
authority and management seek to create such a regional trade hub through the current 
reformation project of the airport. 
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Chapter IV: “We Have to Be Just Like Other Airports”: The 
Making of a Regional Trade Hub 
By looking at how the HGA authority, management, and others affiliated transforming the 
development rationality (see 3.4.1) into practice in the current reformation of HGA. The aim 
of the present chapter is to unfold contemporary dynamics of state formation as seen through 
the current reformation project. 
I will do so by presenting the field of norms and actors involved in the current reformation of 
the airport. To be specific, the two projects are 1) the renovation project of extending, 
renovating, and fencing of the runway, and 2) the project of strengthening the level of security 
inside the airport. My objective of doing so is to unfold current state formation processes 
through the case of the airport renovation and security projects. The chapter is divided into 
two main parts. Firstly, I want to present the norms that drive the reformation projects. This 
will more broadly illustrate the logics behind the reformation. Secondly, I map the actors 
involved in the reformation projects and the ways in which these are brought into play. 
Through the mapping, I display how various actors mobilise the norms and logics as found in 
the first part of this chapter. 
The main conclusion is that the HGA management and authority have internalised certain 
international norms, which have been adapted and mobilised in strategic ways to reach their 
goal of creating an internationally recognised airport. Thus, state formation in Somaliland 
proceeds not by centralising state power but rather by external resources, putting into play a 
strategy termed as extraversion by Jean-Francois Bayart (2000). 
 
4.1 The Norms & Logics of the Airport Reformation Project  
In the following paragraph, I will elaborate on the international web of airport norms deriving 
from the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which I early on in my fieldwork 
detected as the main contributor to the reformation project. I argue that the norms from 
ICAO have been internalised by the airport authorities and management in Hargeisa. 
Furthermore, I will scrutinise which consequences these norms have on how the HGA 
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management and authority try to reach their goal of making a transport hub. I finally argue 
that by adapting to these norms the airport becomes a locus wherefrom Somaliland can seek 
international recognition. 
 
4.1.1 ICAO & the Production of International Airport Norms 
ICAO is an agency under the United Nations (UN), which objectives are “(…) to develop the 
principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of 
international air transport” (David Mackenzie, 2010: IX), to do so, ICAO is involved in the 
“development of airways, airports, and air navigation” (Ibid). ICAO has published an immense list of 
recommendations, manuals, and best practices within a broad array of aspects of airport 
architecture and security protocols, i.e.: runway safety (ICAO, 2005), economic management 
of airports (ICAO, 2013a), airport security (ICAO, 2013b), customs and immigrations 
practices (see i.e. ICAO, 2014 on the best practices of the new e-passport system). One of the 
most noteworthy set of standards in regards to security standards is the ‘Standards and 
Recommended Practices’ (SARPs), which consists of 18 annexes (Michael Milde, 2008: 162 – 
169). The SARPs are not only internationally acknowledged but function as universalising 
principles, which i.e. ‘Annex 17’ on security exemplifies. This particular ‘annex’ is also relevant 
in the current professionalisation and general security in HGA, as “[t]he screening of passengers 
and their hand baggage is a universal international practice and has been intensified and profess ionalized in 
particular after ‘911’ (Ibid: 246). The introduction of hand baggage screening is one of the new 
initiatives at HGA (see Chapter V). The examples of standards and recommendations above 
are just a fragment of international norms stemming from ICAO, however, it displays the 
magnitude of the ICAO produced web of airport norms. 
I will not go into depth with the particularities of these standards, nor make a genealogy of 
ICAO. Instead, I will point attention to ‘article 37’ from the convention adopted in Chicago 
in 194442, which highlights the magnitude of ICAO’s influence on the production of 
international airport norms: 
                                                 
42 The convention was signed in Chicago in 1944 when ICAO was established. ICAO replaced an earlier version of an 
international aviation control body called PICAO. For a lengthy historicity of ICAO read Mackenzie (2010). 
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Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of 
uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, 
personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matter in which such uniformity will facilitate 
and improve air navigation (ICAO, 1944: 15 - 16) 
This links with ICAO’s aim to produce standards and procedures dealing with:   
A. “Communications Systems and air navigation aids, including marking;  
B. Characteristics of airports and landing areas; 
C. Rules of the air and air traffic control practices; 
D. Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel; 
E. Airworthiness of aircraft; 
F. Registration and identification of aircraft; 
G. Collection and exchange of meteorological information; 
H. Log books 
I. Aeronautical maps and charts 
J. Customs and immigration procedures 
K. Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents 
and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as 
may from time to time appear appropriate” (Ibid) 
The web of airport norms thus include in-detail regulations and ways of governing 
international airports. In addition, the SARPs show that they encompass a vast array of aspects 
within aerial travel, personnel management, airport management, and so on. It is worth 
mentioning that ICAO is not only a norm producing body that sets standards, but also a body 
that gathers information from various states’ aviation practices in order to register 
international air traffic and airport characteristics (Milder, 2008). Thus, the international norms 
of ICAO are produced in a dual process between different states’ airport authorities and 
ICAO. In addition, ICAO cannot directly sanction airports that do not oblige with their 
standards and recommendations. Rather, the web of standards and recommendations of 
ICAO are modified through regional, national and local airport programmes and procedures 
(David Delahaye, Jean-Frédéric Étienne and Véronique Viguié Donzeau-Gouge, 2010). 
However, the differences between the international standards and the actual standards of the 
airports are registered and airports are categorised and ranked on this basis. This means that 
the international airport norms are created to both ensure a certain level of security at 
international airports, but also to ensure that ICAO and international airports know the level 
of security of other international airports (Milde, 2008: 156 – 157). 
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Before proceeding, I would like to mention that the international airport norms are mediated 
through interpersonal relations. The Director General told me that prior to the renovation 
project: “(…) they [ICAO] came and gave us instructions and guidelines of what we are doing. Later, they 
[ICAO] came and saw if we did what they advised us to do and they have accepted. We followed their guidelines 
and they have approved”43. Initially ICAO was only interested in supporting and supervising the 
reformation of HGA and not Berbera Airport, however, MCAAT convinced ICAO to help 
plan the reformation of both airports44.  
Thus, ICAO is not simply about manuals, protocols, standards, and recommendations but 
about ‘real’ people with an interests in guiding and controlling local airport management as 
well. The ICAO norms cannot be said to be dictating the HGA airport reformation. Instead, 
the standards and recommendations are modified in interpersonal relations, and adapted in 
strategic ways by the HGA authorities and management. 
 
4.1.2 Internalised Airport Norms: Reforming the Airport through Competition 
& Privatisation 
As I gradually gained access to the HGA authorities and management, I soon realised that 
they relate closely to the ICAO produced international airport norms in their strategising and 
planning of the airport reformation. The Minister of Trade & Investment told me that Turkish 
Airlines45 are planning to start a route to Hargeisa, as they want to be the first to link Europe 
and the HGA market, “(…) they see themselves as a possible big player in the ‘Arab world’”46 as the 
Minister said. For HGA to become part of a global network of airports, the airport 
representatives see it as a necessity to follow the international norms from ICAO to attract 
foreign airlines. 
In fact, the ‘ICAO standards’ mirrored the ways in which the HGA authorities and the 
management envision the future of the airport and the ways they described the airport 
                                                 
43 Interview w. Mr. Omar Abdillahi Aden, Dirctor General, Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport, March 3, 2014 
44 Interview w. Said Mahdi ‘Saqirro’ Ileyee, Legal advisor, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Air Transport, March 29, 2014 
45 See also Yildirim Saldiraner (2013) for a study of the current enlargements of airport facilities in Turkey, and related 
problems  
46 Interview w. Mr. Mohamed Omar, Minister of Trade & Investment, March 6, 2014 
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planning. Visions for the future of the airport were often articulated in relation to ICAO and 
the ICAO standards. 
When we took the power of civil aviation. We were in category 2, in the ICAO standard, now 
we are category 7. We have moved 5 steps in the limited time of 3 years. The next year we hope 
to move to category 10. In the same category as Nairobi and Addis Ababa (…) This is our 
milestone, within a limited time47 (Director General of MCAAT)  
As the interview excerpt demonstrates, the HGA management describe their goals for the 
airport in competitive terms – in relation to other airports and in relation to the ICAO ranking 
of international airports. This relates to Jean-Paul D. Addie’s statement “(…) competition between 
air hubs is being framed at the global level, while the discourse and practices of airport governance clearly 
internalize the logics of globalized economic competitiveness” (2014: 96). Thus, the reformation of the 
airport has to be understood in the neo-liberal framework of global airport competition and 
privatisation. 
 
Airport Competition 
The airport manager referred to the competition of international airports, when he told me 
that he dreamt that the airport would: “(…) look like other large modern airports”48, he continued: 
The future goal is that we are recognised [acknowledged internationally as a good 
airport]: we have to connect to other airports, we have to be just like other airports, like in 
Nairobi, Addis and so on. I go around and make brotherhood to other airports and see how 
they do it: that is why I was in Djibouti49 
Thus, by moving up the ICAO airport ranking HGA seeks to imitate and become similar to 
other airports. Competition and airport development is not a unique feature to the HGA case. 
Cynthia Akwei, Mathew Tsamenyi, and Hadiza Sa’id’ studied the performance measurements 
of the Ghanaian Airport Kotoka. They conclude that the airport: “(…) meet the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards [to] enhance their competitiveness and profitability” (2012: 
538). The authors introduce their paper by stating that increasing competition among airports 
has formed airport developments and led to deregulation, privatisation, and commercialisation 
                                                 
47 Interview w. Mr. Omar Abdillahi Aden, Director General, Ministry of Aviation & Air Transport, March 3, 2014 
48 Interview w. Mr. Mohamed Yusuf Ismail, Airport Manager, April 20, 2014 
49 Ibid 
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(Ibid). Participating in airport competition is, thus, an integral part of international airport’s 
reformation logics in general. As the statements of the authorities and management of HGA 
show, participating in global airport competition is also part of the development and 
reformation of HGA. 
During my stay in Hargeisa, the Minister of MCAAT was in Turkey to discuss the present 
problem of airspace governance. Instead, I visited ‘Saqirro’, a legal advisor at MCAAT. I asked 
about his future dreams of the airport. He answered, “ICAO categorises airports. The dream is to 
move up in these categories”50.  His precise, short answer illustrates well the competition logic 
embodied in the HGA authorities and management. The dreams and aspirations of the people 
associated with placing HGA on the world map of airport hubs demonstrate well how the 
airport authorities and management have internalised the international airport norms from 
ICAO. 
 
Privatisation 
The privatisation is maybe 
most boldly evident in the 
collection of exit fees and in 
the general luggage handling in 
HGA. National Airport 
Services & Ground Handling 
Agent (NASHA) is a private 
company that check in luggage 
and handle incoming 
luggage51. NASHA also 
collects exit fees from 
outgoing travellers. The fees are used for maintenance of the equipment. The tax collection 
                                                 
50 Interview w. Said Mahdi ‘Saqirro’ Ileyee, Legal advisor, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Air Transport, March 29, 2014 
51 Field notes, April 27, 2014 
Copy of author’s exit-fee receipt 
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by NASHA clearly illustrates that the privatisation logics have been operationalised and shows 
in a concrete way that various private actors area are involved in the border practices at HGA. 
Another example of how the privatisation logics are embodied at HGA, is through coming 
privatisation of the MCAAT52 (Ministry of National Planning & Development, 2011: 119). 
The plan is to make a body separate from the government, which according to MCAAT and 
MTI, will create a more efficient airport authority. 
An airport should be managed by an independent body. Government should be represented, but 
we should have a Somaliland Aviation Authority and not a Ministry of Aviation (…) 
Governments and ministries make policies they should not govern airports, an agency should do 
this – it is more efficient53. 
It is here important to mention that other agencies in Somaliland’s infrastructural network 
have been privatised most notably: the Berbera Port Authority and the Road Development 
Authority54 (Ministry of Planning & Development, 2011: 102 - 106). Thus, the creation of an 
aviation authority is a further privatisation of the management of Somaliland infrastructure. 
Privatisation of public goods, as infrastructure can be said to be, is a tendency seen across a 
variety of African states (see i.e. Geest & Obirih-Opareh, 2009; Alou, 2009 or Blundo & 
Olivier de Sardan, 2006: 103 – 104). 
State formation, as viewed through the making of a regional trade hub, does not happen by 
centralising state power, as one might think. On the contrary, state formation in Somaliland 
occurs by spreading out state capacity to private actors. This relates to Brenda Chalfin’s 
findings from Tema Harbor in Ghana. Here she finds that there has been a shift in the type 
of power from national to multinational resources and that the state does so to express itself 
as a state (2000: 185 – 186). This follows, like Chalfin also argues, that by spreading out state 
their ability to strengthen their border legitimacy the state in the international realm (Ibid). 
This relates well to my argument that the norms are not imposed on HGA authorities and 
management but rather they are adopted to reach their goal of creating a regional trade hub. 
 
                                                 
52 Interview w. Mustafa Awad, Adam Smith International , April 14, 2014 
53 Interview w. Mohamed Omar, Minister of Trade and Investments, March 6, 2014 
54 Field notes, March 26, 2014 
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4.2.2 The Airport as Locus of Recognition Seeking 
The airport is currently being reformed in accordance with certain international norms and 
neoliberal logics of privatisation and competition. This has very concrete consequences for 
how the airport is being shaped. The privatisation of the airport authority and the conduct of 
NASHA, the private airport service agency, are two examples illustrating in the outsourcing 
of state capacities. 
The quote ’we have to look just like other airports’ frames well how the management and authority 
think and, maybe more importantly, how they act in the creation of an internationally 
acknowledged airport that can compete with other airports in East Africa. The HGA 
management and authority seek to imitate other international airports and make use of the 
norms from the international organisation ICAO to create a regional trade hub. I thus argue 
that Somaliland is increasingly making use of what Bayart has labelled as strategies of 
extraversions by “mobilising resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external 
environment” (2000: 218). In this case, it happens by the HGA management and authority’s 
adaptation of international norms and logics. This has led to privatisation and increasing focus 
on competition as a mean to attract more airlines. This means, I argue, that the airport 
becomes a locus where Somaliland can seek international recognition in a different way than 
through the official state-to-state forms of recognition.  In other words, based on the adaption 
and strategic mobilisation of international norms, Somaliland seeks recognition through the 
making of an international recognised airport and thus displaying their capacity to regulate 
mobility and securing their borders. Thereby the seeking of recognition is dislocated from 
official international state recognition manoeuvres to other forms of getting recognition 
through the equally international field of airport reforms. Thus, the current airport renovation 
and security projects illustrate that contemporary state formation occurs in various sites of the 
state wherefrom the state can seek alternative recognition. I will now dig further into how 
external resources in the shape of international actors are brought into play in the making of 
the airport. 
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4.2 Mapping Airport Actors: Mobilising Airport Norms 
In this second part of the analysis, I display the diverse mix of international and national, state 
and non-state actors who are brought into play in the reformation of the airport. The point of 
this is to show how these actors mobilise the norms I described in the first part of the analysis. 
The mapping of airport actors illustrates that ties to various actors, with very different reasons 
to participate, have been used to finance the projects. Furthermore, I will illustrate how 
international expert organisations mobilise the airport norms. This further underlines the 
argument made in the first part of the chapter that state formation in Somaliland proceeds by 
strategically making use of external resources. 
 
4.2.1 The Field of Investors: Using External Ties 
I met the Minister of Interior, Mr. Ali Mohamed Waran Ade in the airport lounge where 
pictures of the former Somaliland presidents decorated the walls alongside large Somaliland 
flags. We were served a cup of sweet Somali tea when the Minister began his story about his 
friendship with the Kuwaiti Emir’s son. A friendship that was very helpful  funding the airport 
reformation projects. The Emir of Kuwait has several houses and farms in Somalia – among 
these a house for his son in the city of Sheikh in the north of Somaliland 55. According to the 
minister, he showed the son of the Emir the rundown condition of the runway in Hargeisa. 
“(…) ‘look, we need to rebuild this’”56 he had said to him. “I wrote a letter to the king [Emir]. I wrote: 
‘you used to love Somaliland, now we need your help to rebuild our airports ’”57. The Emir of Kuwait has 
a long tradition for visiting Somaliland (and Somalia) for hunting purposes. In an interview 
that I conducted with the Director General of MCAAT in his office in Hargeisa, he too 
elaborated on the Emir family’s interests in improving the infrastructure in Somaliland.  
These guys [the emir and his family] like the wild and hunting so they want to come to our 
country and hunt. They want a place to sit down and settle. There is a town here called Sheikh. 
It is a good place, very beautiful; they constructed a 3 million house there. See Berbera airport. 
                                                 
55 Interview w. Mr. Said ‘Saqirro’ Mahdi Ileeye, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport, March 29, 
2014 
56 Interview w. Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Minister of Interior, April 21, 2014 
57 Ibid 
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They also constructed a million dollar house with space for boats. Whatever we need we request 
(…) they are good people.58 
The quote above shows that the close ties with the Emir, an external actors, was brought into play to 
help facilitate the making of the airport. Ties to the Japanese government and the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) department: The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)59 were utilised as well (Ministry of 
Civil Aviation & Air Transport, 2012: 3). Mustafa Awad, an employee from Adam Smith International 
(ASI) (see section 4.2.2) helped me immensely by filling me in on the conduct of ASI and showing me 
around the airport. According to Awad, the UK interest is in professionalising the security at HGA 
started when the threat of terror60 increased in London prior to the Olympic Games in 2012. 
The airport security project by ASI is due to national British interests: people are not screened 
well here in Somaliland and the UK government is afraid for the threat of terror in UK by 
Somalis coming to UK through i.e. Hargeisa, so they want to enhance the level of security in 
Somaliland61. 
Thus, the funding from the UK should be viewed as part of the UK government’s interest in 
securing its own territory against terrorist attacks by strengthening border control overseas 62 
(UK Government, 2011: 44 – 56; UK Government, 2010: 28 – 29). The funding and support 
of HGA’s security project is one part of the larger UK interests in securing borders abroad  63.  
Thus, the two countries interests in securing Somaliland’s borders coincide for their mutual 
good. 
The funding of the airport improvements, thus, show that Somaliland officials and diplomats 
have used various ties and used various opportunities to attract economic investments. This 
is further evident from the talk I had with ‘Saqirro’, the legal advisor at MCAAT, who 
explained how the airport was financed through their ties to Kuwait and UK. 
Somaliland returned to the sheik to funding the extension of the runway. And [we asked] UK, 
our old masters: please, help us now big man [heavy laughing]. For help they provided security 
by Adam Smith International, who became the contractor of setting up the security system. 64 
                                                 
58 Interview w. Mr. Omar Abdillahi Aden, Director General, Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport, March 3, 2014 
59 E-mail correspondence w. Mustafa Awad, Adam Smith International employee, August 19, 2014 
60 ’Al Shabaab’ in specific 
61 Interview w. Mustafa Awad, Adam Smith International employee, April 14, 2014 
62 part of the ‘counter terrorism’ approaches 
63 FCO support a range of other security projects at other Somali airports, as well as other ‘counter terrorism’ projects in 
Somalia and Somaliland (UK Government, 2011) 
64 Interview w. Interview w. Mr. Said ‘Saqirro’ Mahdi Ileeye, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Civil Aviation & Air Transport, 
March 29, 2014 
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Besides FCO and the Kuwait Fund, the Somaliland government, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), local businessmen, and private companies such as 
Dahabshiil65 and Telesom66 have contributed to  last years improvements as well67(Ministry of 
Civil Aviation & Air Transport, 2012). In return, Dahabshiil and Telesom advertise their 
products inside and outside the airport buildings. This also illustrates the neo-liberal logics as 
I mentioned in the first part of the analysis. Even though the development of the airport is a 
national project of Somaliland, the investors involved reveal that various international interests 
at different levels and with different agenda participate in the formation of the airport.  
The interests of the UK government, Kuwait Emir, and the funding from various other actors, 
display that the infrastructural improvements in Somaliland is facilitated through private, 
public, local, national and international actors. 
 
4.2.2 Mobilising Airport Norms through Transnational Expert Organisations 
Through the concrete airport projects I will now demonstrate that international airport norms 
are mobilised and transferred to construction workers, airport agents, and airport officials 
through a range of various transnational expert organisations. Firstly, this shows that a vast 
array of actors are involved in the reformation of the airport. Secondly, it illustrates that the 
concrete process of mobilising the norms runs through the conduct of certain international 
expert actors. Meaning that the reformation of the airport needs to be conceptualised at more 
than one level (cf. Truillot, 2003: 83). 
A Somaliland contractor called Daryeel Construction Company carries out the day-to-day 
construction work of extending the runway as well as fencing the airport area (daryeel.com)68.  
The day-to-day construction work is conducted under the supervision of the Kuwaiti 
consultancy: Dr. Nabeel Abdul-Raheem Consultants (NARCO). NARCO is an international 
engineering consultancy with projects around the world in various areas of infrastructural 
                                                 
65 A money transfer company 
66 A telecommunication company 
67 Interview w. Mohamed Yusuf Ismail, HGA Airport Manager, April 20, 2014 
68 Interview w. Dr. Rami, April 10, 2014 
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engineering69 (see also narco-kw.com). NARCO tests materials by i.e. checking the quality of 
the poles at the security-fence70. Furthermore, NARCO plans the continuous proceedings of 
the construction work, i.e. by making risk analyses71. NARCO kindly invited me to join one 
of their two daily visits to the construction sites. In the NARCO office I met a young engineer, 
I asked him about the knowledge on which they base their supervision 
First, we check what needs to be done, then we tell the contractor [Daryeel] what to do and then 
we come back: approve or tell them to change it. (…) We follow the ICAO specifications. For 
instance, the shoulders need to have a certain width to be able to receive certain flights (…) the 
standards tell us how to do excavation, levelling, and how to do the actual constructions”72 
The excerpt from my short talk with the NARCO employee demonstrates that NARCO is 
implementing the ICAO produced international standards. Concretely, the ICAO standards 
determine the width of the apron and how long the runway and fencing have to be to enable 
certain types of airplanes to land and take off. Even the type and size of the stones used for 
the specific type of renovation of the runway is conducted in accordance with particular 
international acknowledged standards73. Concretely, this means that the airport area is 
currently being expanded and fenced for security reasons74. NARCO is in this way an actor 
that mobilises the international norms to the actual day-to-day work at the various 
construction sites at HGA. This is to a large extent possible due to their role as an expert 
organisation. 
Similar types of dynamics can be found in the indoor security project. A group of experts from 
the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and Adam Smith International (ASI) 
helped to implement the new security standards and install various security machines75. ASI is 
a private service business that: “(…) support economic growth and government reform” 
(adamsmithinternational.com). ASI operates worldwide and was hired to ‘professionalise’ the 
security at the airport76 (for more on the effects of the professionalisation of airport security 
                                                 
69 Interview w. Dr. Rami, NARCO employee, April 10, 2014 
70 Fiel notes, April 23, 2014 
71 Ibid 
72 Field notes, April 10, 2014 
73 Field notes, April 23, 2014  
74 Ibid 
75 Interview w. Mustafa Awad, employee at Adam Smith International, April 14, 2014 
76 Ibid 
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see 5.1). IOM is a Swizz based intergovernmental organisation agency of the UN. IOM work 
with a vast amount of migration projects (iom.int). In practice, ASI sat up scanners, a 
fingerprint identification system, screeners and a closed circuit television (CCTV). 
Furthermore, together IOM and ASI trains airport personnel in luggage management and 
educates staff in how to operate the scanner and do security checks77. In addition, ASI hires 
immigration and border protection experts to provide training for the immigration 
department, both to officials as well as lower rank officers. These officials have also been on 
‘exposure tours’ in the region and in the UK to learn about how to conduct border control78. 
The role of the expert organisations illustrate that the mobilisation of the various security 
instalments and renovations runs through the expert organisation. Thus, the reformation of 
the airport needs to be conceptualised in a global framework of actors and international norms.  
 
4.2.3 The Airport: A Field of Multiple Levels 
Although the expert organisations are non-governmental, their conduct have clear 
ramifications for how the airport is reformed and thus how mobility is regulated by i.e. 
implementing border control protocols or by enlarging the airport area (I will  return to these 
projects in Chapter V). I would like to make clear at this point that I do not criticise the work 
of ASI, NARCO, IOM, ICAO or any of the Somaliland actors. Rather, the point is that various 
transnational expert organisations are involved in strengthening Somaliland’s borders by 
enabling more secure flights in and out of its territory, as well as enhancing border control by 
training airport agents in internationally acknowledged forms of airport security conduct. 
Thus, the strengthening of Somaliland border security runs through the conduct of a set of 
transnational experts, who base their knowledge on international norms and implement these 
through training national actors, exposure tours, and by installing technological equipment . 
This relates closely to Nikolas Rose and Peter Millers argument that problems (in this case the 
problem of securing mobility at the airport) are solved through the use of expertise and 
through the conduct of non-state actors in neo-liberal forms of government (1992: 187). As 
                                                 
77 E-mail correspondence w. Mustafa Away, employee at Adam Smith International, August 19, 2014 
78 Ibid 
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mentioned above, I do not argue that the international web of airport norms are imposed on 
the HGA authorities and management, rather they are used strategically by bringing 
international expert organisations into play in the objective of creating a proffesionalised, 
secure airport. 
Although Somaliland state capacities can be said to be outsourced to private actors, the state 
reinforces its capacities to govern its territory for the same reason. In an analysis of the Tema 
Harbor in Ghana, Chalfin, has similarly found that the Ghanaian state revoke “(…) its exclusive 
territorial control (…) in order to strengthen its capacity to regulate and oversee that territory and build national 
legitimacy from without as well as within (2010: 170). Similarly is the HGA authority and 
management delegating the task of strengthening its borders to other actors, however, it does 
so to demonstrate that it is a state with a strong border-control. Thus, the reformation of the 
airport shows that Somaliland state formation needs to be conceptualised at both the national 
and international level. 
 
4.3 Part Conclusion: State Formation through Extraversion 
The ways in which the airport is being formed and managed today is modified through 
international norms of airport practices. I found that HGA authorities and management have 
internalised the norms stemming from ICAO and refer to these when articulating their dreams 
for the future of the airport. This has led to a process where HGA is undergoing 
commercialisation and privatisation to accommodate the norms from ICAO and through this 
become an acknowledged airport in the region. I argue, like Chalfin, that through these 
processes state capacitates are outsourced to create an image of a strong state (2010: 186). 
Thus, the norms are not imposed on Somaliland actors and authorities. On the contrary,  these 
international norms are rather used as a calculated strategy of making a regional trade hub as 
the internalisation of airport norms by the airport authorities and management also 
demonstrate. 
On this basis, I argue that the airport becomes a locus for seeking recognition in a different 
way than through official state recognition seeking. Furthermore, I illustrate that the process 
of airport reform occurs through a web of multifaceted international, local, private, and public 
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actors that are brought into play in different ways. This further strengthen the argument above 
and lead me to conclude that state formation in Somaliland today does not happen by 
centralising state capacitates, rather it proceeds by spreading out functions to various private 
and non-state actors. It is by adapting and mobilising international acknowledged practices 
and norms that Somaliland displays its ability to rule over its own territory – or its sovereignty 
if you will. By drawing on Bayart’s (2000) concept of ‘extraversion’. I therefore argue that 
Somaliland is ‘reaching out’ towards the international arena and making use of external 
resources in their current state formation proceedings. This stands in contrast to the dominant 
analysis of Somaliland state formation as scholars have argued that state formation has 
occurred through a ‘going it alone’ strategy, as I pointed out in the introduction (cf. Prunier, 
2008, see also Bradbury, 2008: 256 - 257). However, evidence from the margins of the state 
shows a different picture of Somaliland’s state formation processes. By turning the analytical 
lens towards the airport, I argue that the state formation occurs by making use of external 
resources – through a strategy of extraversion (cf. Bayart, 2000).  
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Chapter V: Regulating Mobility and Forging Imaginations of 
the State 
I will now turn to the everyday security practices in and around the airport. I will do so by 
scrutinising the interactions between the individual traveller and various airport agents. As 
pointed out in the introduction, I see the airport as a place that represents the sovereign power 
of the state denoting that the airport agent become representatives for the state. This means 
that I consider the interaction between the airport agents and the individual traveller as a 
depiction of how the state represents itself as a state and as an exemplification of everyday 
state formation. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part will analyse the encounters between 
the individual and airport agent combined with what this mean to how the state constructs 
itself, following what type of state image is being produced through these interactions. I will, 
in the second part of the analysis present three cases from the airport that show how the 
practices of regulating mobility is negotiated and contested in various ways. The main findings 
are that these negotiations and contestations create very specific ways of how one can move 
through and around the airport. The point is that the state is constantly being contested and 
negotiated and which denotes that everyday encounters are playing part in the constant and 
daily (re)formation of the state. 
 
5.1 Airport Security: Practices of the State 
The various technologies and practices are set in place to make aerial travel to and from the 
airport more secure, as well as to create a safe flow of people in and out of the airport. Fencing  
the runway, for instance, is one of the concrete measures created to secure in- and outgoing 
flights from trespassers (such as goats and nosy fieldworkers). Thus, airports and air travel are, 
to use John Urry’s phrase, ‘sites of riskiness’ and thus all about controlling these risks (2009: 
28). Peter Adey has articulated this nexus between security and mobility as: “(…) mobility has 
become a problematic of security as an object that needs securing” (2009: 276). I therefore view HGA as 
a space intervened by various technologies and practices seeking to securitise and register 
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mobility in and out of Somaliland. Thus, airport practices are, I argue following Tim Cresswell, 
imbued with power and disciplinary activities with a web of practices and technologies to 
regulate mobility (2000: 219 - 258). 
The renovation and security projects at HGA are set in place to enable HGA to connect with 
other airports as more airlines are now willing to land aircrafts due to the higher level of 
security (as also mentioned in Chapter IV). The (soon to be) extended runway is a concrete 
example of how HGA will attract other airlines with larger aircrafts that can transport more 
goods and people in and out of Somaliland. Turkish Airlines is one airline that is planning to 
service HGA (as I noted in Chapter III, see also Somalilandpress, 2014). Thus, the various 
procedures, technologies, and general professionalisations make certain types of mobility 
possible. This observation can also be made in relation to the security inside the airport, where 
various technologies and practices have been set up to sort unwanted from wanted individuals  
and refrain them from entering or exiting the state (see also Adey, 2008: 438 – 439). In other 
words to secure systematic, safe, and informed border crossings79. The specific practices and 
technologies that have recently been installed is: a fingerprint identification system, a CCTV-
system, and a database system that register and store the names and data of incoming and 
outgoing travellers80. In addition, the Immigration Department staff have been trained which 
at HGA mainly consist of passport control and VISA control officers81. 
I will now dwell on these practices and technologies that regulate mobility across the border 
site and analyse the encounters between airport agents and individual to reflect on what this 
means for how the state represents itself. 
 
5.1.1 Manifesting the State 
By moving through Hargeisa Egal International Airport, both the arriving as well as the 
departing individual meets various airport agents in the form of passport controllers, tax 
collectors, VISA controllers, guards and the like. In addition, the traveller interacts with a 
                                                 
79 Not only Somaliland’s borders, but also the UK border, which can be said to be secured from afar through supporting 
the strengthening of HGA’s level of security  
80 Email correspondence w. Mustafa Awad, employee at Adam Smith International, August 19, 2014 
81 Ibid 
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range of electronic machines: body scanners, fingerprint identification scanner, surveillance 
cameras, and so on. These interactions produce a range of data, which is registered in databases  
by the Immigration Department under the Ministry of Interior82. This data is stored for the 
Immigration Department to know exactly who is in the country, for how long, why and who 
they are. In other words to distinguish one person from the next based on personal facts (see 
also Adey, 2009: 277). 
VISA and passport controls are two 
specific ways in which the facts 
about (part of) the individual is 
made visible to the airport agent. 
Through the VISA control, the 
traveller’s nationality, reason of stay, 
and duration of his/her stay in 
Somaliland are highlighted. 
In the same way, the passport 
reveals the traveller’s travel history, 
gender, and other facts of the 
traveller thereby transforming the 
body “(…) into text so that it may be 
read” (Adey, 2004: 1371). The last 
quote is taken from Adey’s article 
on airport surveillance systems, in 
which he further argues that airport 
surveillance brings out the body of 
the individual traveller (Ibid: 1369 - 1372). In other words, the individual traveller needs to 
reveal these facts about him/her, as well as other bodily facts (gender, height, and so on) to 
the state to gain access to cross the state border. To gain access to the state is thus obtained 
through the visa process and identity paper, as also pointed out my Mark B. Salter (2006: 170). 
                                                 
82 Ibid 
Copy of author’s Somaliland VISA: A Method of Visualisation 
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The copy of my VISA shows my name, nationality, reason of stay, profession, and passport 
number (which I have concealed here). My encounter with the VISA system brings certain 
individual traits of me to the sight of the state. The VISA is one out of many encounters which 
make (parts of me) visible to the state.  This relate well with Louise Amoore’s study of the US 
border practices, where she notices that “(…) the subject become objectivised through a series of dividing 
practices which break up the subject into calculable risk factors both within herself (student, employee, tourist, 
man) and also in relation to others (alien, immigrant, illegal)” ( 2006: 339). Knowing the individual’s 
history, identity, and reason for crossing the border are fundamental facts for airport agents 
to assess the risk of the moving individual thus presenting bodily and personal data are 
fundamental for the individual to enter the state. One ASI employee articulated the importance 
of knowing the individual: “(…) if we contain them, they won’t explode”83. By containing, he referred 
to containing individuals in databases and registers so that the state can assess the risk inside 
its territory (see also Pat O’Malley, 2006). 
My observations relate well with Salter’s, who, by building on Foucault’s concept of the 
‘confessionary complex’, argues that “(…) [A]s travellers are conditioned to confess their history, 
intentions and identity, they submit to the examining power of the sovereign (…) [C]onfession is the toll of our 
entry into the political community” (Salter, 2007: 59). Thus, crossing borders activates a range of 
practices during which the traveller has to confess certain details about him/herself, which 
brings important information about individual to the fore. I, much like Salter, see the 
examining power of the state representatives as a series of ‘confessional rites’. By ‘confessional 
rites’ I mean the particular examining practices the traveller must submit to, to pass from the 
international territory in the airport and cross over to the national territory, or from the 
national territory into the international ditto. Building on one of Salter’s earlier arguments: that 
international border crossings are based on ‘rites of passage’, I see how the individual has to 
enact certain rites to cross from one side of the border to the other (2005: 37 - 39).  The 
traveller must make certain gestures (take off shoes before being scanned or put ones finger 
on the finger scanner) for the airport agent to obtain certain data about the individual. It is 
only through these rites one can get permission by the airport agents to move on from one 
                                                 
83 Excerpt from field notes, April 27, 2014 
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‘confessional rite’ to the next until one has reached the other side and can enter or exit  the 
state. 
I see the interaction at the airport as a power relation in which the individual confesses to the 
airport agent in order to display his/her innocence, or non-risk, to an authority who can grant 
the right to cross the border(s). Thus, the interactions are based on a power relation where the 
airport agents have the authority to examine the individual. The process of scanning the 
moving body is a good example of the ‘confessional rite’. The following example was played 
out in the ‘security building’ where I waited for a friend to return after he had said farewell to 
some friends leaving Somaliland. I see the excerpt as an example of how the moving body is 
submitted to enact a ‘confessional rite’ 
I waited for Kenedid to return and drive me back to Hargeisa, I sat on a bench at the security 
machine and small talked with Mr. Osman [who is the operational manager of HGA] 
here I saw that all people went through the body scanner, most were also scanned with the hand-
scanner. Some tried to get around the body scanner, but all were directed back and led through 
the scanner84. 
The field note above illustrates how some try to resist but in the end, all individuals submit to 
the examining power. This means more concretely that the mundane security practices are 
ways of producing the airport agents – or state representatives – as authorities with the right 
to examine the individual. 
Thus, I argue that the practice of ‘confessional rites’ and the production of the knowledge they 
produce on the individual create an understanding of the state as the legitimate authority who 
has the right to examine the individual. In the words of Ferguson and Gupta, it is through 
these practices that the Somaliland “state comes to be understood as a concrete, overarching, spatially 
encompassing reality” (2002: 981). By engaging in the various security technologies and practices, 
what I call ‘confessional rites’, the interactions between airport agents legitimise the states right 
to detect and recognise the individual. Based on Gupta and Ferguson ideas I see how these 
encounters manifest state authority and thereby naturalises itself as entity with the right to 
examine the individual (2002: 986). 
                                                 
84 Field notes, April 15 
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5.1.2 Seeing the State: “The Face of the 
Nation” 
The VISA is not only a way in which the individual 
becomes visual to the state, the state also becomes 
visual to the individual. I.e. your VISA is stamped 
with the official logo from Somaliland’s 
Immigration Department. The stamp in my 
passport as illustrated here shows the amount of 
time I was allowed to stay in Somaliland. The 
Somaliland flag and the airport agent’s uniforms as 
you see in the airport are other symbols of the 
Somaliland state. Thus, it becomes evident that the 
airport is a site where the Somaliland state “(…) is 
represented and reproduced in visible everyday forms, such as language of legal practice, the architecture of public 
buildings, the wearing of military uniforms, or the marking out of policing of frontiers”  (Timothy Mitchell, 
1991: 81). 
 I concluded in Chapter IV that mobilisation of the recent security technologies and practices 
has to be conceptualised in a field of multifaceted actors and adaptation to international 
norms. The current chapter has so far showed that these practices also represent Somaliland 
as a sovereign state (cf. Chalfin, 2010: 170). In other words, although the airport practices and 
technologies are installed through a complex network of transnational actors, the image of the 
Somaliland state as the sovereign ruler is strengthened through these very same practices.  
The HGA authorities and management also articulate the airport as a way of displaying the 
state. Mr. Osman Ibrahim, the Operational Manager of HGA, whom I met shortly in the 
airport, told me that the airport signifies the ‘mirror of the conditions of the state’85. The pride 
of creating an international airport also became evident when Mustafa Awad, an employee at 
ASI, showed me around the airport. On this particular trip, I spoke with a young staff member 
                                                 
85 Field notes, April 15, 2014 
Copy of author’s passport 
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from the CCTV staff who had just returned from a security management programme in 
London. He told me that “the airport is the face of the country – it is the first thing you see”86. I asked 
him what he hoped people would notice as the first thing in Somaliland . He replied “Somaliland 
have peace and stability and we want people to feel safe when they arrive. This is why security is so important 
to have here”87. Building an airport is thus more than paving a runway it is also about 
constructing an image, or narrative, of the state. According to the young staff member, the 
Somaliland narration is one of peace and security. In this way, the airport connects Somaliland 
both to the international and to the national itself. Thus, the practices of making a regional 
trade hub is on one side a way of placing Hargeisa within the international infrastructure of 
airports – a way of connecting Somaliland to the ‘outside world’, and through this create 
leverage to become a business hub and grow economically when doing so. On the other side, 
it is also a way of showing – or presenting – Somaliland to the world. 
 
5.2 Contesting & Negotiating Mobility Regulations 
The following will dig further into various encounters at the airport, to shed light upon how 
the state is constantly being contested and negotiated in its attempt to regulate mobility. I will 
work my way from the outside and in through the airport via three cases. Starting at the outside 
fence construction, which is contested by neighbours to the airport. I will then move into the 
security building, which is a separate building from the departure terminal to demonstrate how 
a ‘confessional rite’ is resisted and contested and through this that the interpersonal relations 
between airport agent and individual has transformed towards a more anonymous type of 
airport practice. Thirdly, I will move all the way inside the departure terminal and luggage 
management to look at how a private airline company and the luggage management at HGA 
is affecting the ways in which people and luggage can move through the airport. 
The three following cases will in each their way demonstrate that state is contested and 
negotiated in various daily encounters and that through these encounters we can observe 
negotiations of current state formation processes. 
                                                 
86 Field notes, April 27, 2014 
87 Ibid 
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5.2.1 Case I: Conflicting Types of Mobility  
I will in the following section share an experience I had when I visited various constructions 
sites with the Kuwaiti consultancy NARCO. On one particular visit, I experienced that the 
project of fencing the runway and the airport area makes some types of mobility more difficult. 
The residents of the small 
villages south of the 
airport are discontent 
with the enlargement of 
the airport area; the 
fencing in particular. 
According to the airport 
manager, the land issue 
was solved by 
compensating the local 
community economically 
and offering relocation88.  
Some state officials said 
that people then moved to the airport area to reside only to claim relocation money89. Land 
ownership and access to land is by no means unique, in fact, it is the most frequent source of 
conflict in Somaliland (Academy for Peace & Development, 2005). I will not analyse who is 
right or wrong in this case, however I would like to share an excerpt from my field notes, 
which illustrates how the airport improvements create and influence other types of mobility 
than those strictly relating to air travel: 
We walked on to the fencing. Here some workers were putting up the poles for later wiring. 
There was no wire anywhere, so people could freely walk into the airport area. He  [Mo, 
NARCO employee] told me that there has been some problems with people living to the 
south of the airport. They were not happy with the airport expansion and fencing of the airport. 
They said that it was disturbing their habitats and their living space. There has even been small 
                                                 
88 Interview w. Mohamed Yusuf Ismail, Airport Manager, April 20, 2014 
89 Ibid; Interview w. Omar Abdillahi Aden, Director Gerneal of Ministry of Aviation, March 3, 2014; Interview w. Abdi, 
local scholar, March 30, 2014 
Local bus driving past unfinished fence and into airport area, (author’s 
picture) 
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fighting between the people living there and the workers, Mo told me. (…) While we were 
looking at the fencing a bus drove past the poles and through the airport area and all the way 
to the other side of the airport – from south to north through the airport area. Apparently, there 
is a road going through the airport leading to small villages and I later saw several people 
walking on that road to or from the villages. He [Mo, NARCO employee] said that when 
the fence is done they will have to go around it”90. 
Although the current airport improvements enable certain types of mobility it also disables, or 
complicates, other types of mobility. 
This shows a state who is willing to readjust local mobility patterns in the pursuit of the 
creation of an internationally acknowledged airport. Thus, state formation is inherently 
conflictual (see also section 3.3.3). In this case, the conflict lies in the choice between two 
types of mobility. The access to the villages are fought between local residents and 
construction workers, which demonstrate that state formation and mobilisation of 
international norms are not simply placed in a state’s central administration but that they are 
an everyday concern for local actors as well. The encounters also illustrate broader state 
dynamics of land dispute, in this case based on conflicting types of mobility. 
 
5.2.2 Case II: Contesting Security: Towards Anonymous Airport Practices 
I will now move into the ‘security building’. The security building is an annex that all travellers 
and personnel go through before entering the departure terminal airport91. Here, a new 
combined body and luggage scanner has been installed. This second case demonstrates how 
the new security technologies alter the type of interactions between airport agents and 
individuals. 
I was invited to meet the Minister of Interior in the Airport’s VIP lounge. My gatekeeper, 
translator, and friend Dr. Mustafa and I went to the airport. We were greeted by a security 
guard who awaited us at the security building to bring us to the VIP lounge:  
(…) we went to the security building. The security guard would bring us through the security 
check. The security guard wanted to walk around the scanner, he was not allowed to. When he 
realised he had to be scanned he became very upset. However, the woman at the security machine 
                                                 
90 Excerpt from field notes, Visit to construction site w. Mo, NARCO employee, April 23 
91 Field notes, April 27, 2014 
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calmly let him know that the rules applied to all going through the security building, as Dr. 
Mustafa later translated for me. He threw his walkie-talkie into the tray on the conveyer belt 
leading into the baggage scanner and walked while loudly protesting through the body scanner. 
He was not trying to hide his dissatisfaction with the situation. I was quite impressed by the 
calmness of the women at the scanners92. 
The example from the security building illustrates that all people moving through the security 
building have to be scanned and searched in the same compulsory manner (see also Chalfin, 
2010: 158 – 186 for a similar finding in Tema Harbor, Ghana). In addition, the new scanner 
transform the type of relationship between airport agent and individual traveller from being 
dependent on interpersonal relations towards a more anonymous type of security practice. 
Whereas the interaction between traveller and airport security was previously a person-to-
person relation (manual search), the new type of interactions is preformed through machines. 
Thus, the professionalization through the adoption of the international security standards 
makes the security practice less interpersonal. The fingerprint registration is another example 
of such more anonymous type of border practice. 
 
5.2.2 Case III: Negotiating Security Standards: Double Inspections 
The third, and last, case is from the indoor activities at the airport. Here I will focus on how 
mobility throughout the airport is being re-organised thereby reshaping the particular way 
travellers and their luggage move through the airport. 
On my departing flight from Hargeisa I experienced how Ethiopian Airlines conducts a double 
inspection of their costumer’s hand baggage. The double inspection has to be understood in 
light of the suicide bombings in Hargeisa in 2008 where Al Shabaab targeted the UNDP office 
and the Ethiopian Airlines’ office in downtown Hargeisa causing the death of several 
Ethiopian Airlines’ clients. This resulted in a three-year suspension of Ethiopian Airlines 
serviced flights to Hargeisa. However, in 2012 Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights to and from 
HGA due to a range of new security instalments put in function (see section 4.2.2; see also 
Somalilandsun, 2012/b). Although Ethiopian Airlines has continued using HGA, the airline 
company now has a separate set of security procedures. This is most evident in the departure 
                                                 
92 Translated excerpt from field diary, April 21, 2014 
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lounge where Ethiopian Airlines has a separate section for their customers. In this separate 
upper section in the departure lounge, Ethiopian Airlines has their own additional security 
check of costumer’s hand baggage conducted before the traveller enters one of their aircrafts.  
After I had checked-in and been through a range of security and taxation procedures, I entered 
the departure lounge. Here I saw rows of benches facing towards the apron and runway, as one 
sees in most airports. However, what I found different was that I was (…) told to walk up a 
set of stairs to enter the separate upper departure lounge for travellers flying with Ethiopian 
Airlines (…) Before, we entered the airplane our bags where manually searched. The ‘searcher’ 
took our bags as we sat and waited for the airplane and just before entering the plane. We had 
to stand in line in front of a table. At the table, we recognised our respective bags and opened 
them for the ‘searcher’93. 
The excerpt from my diary, shows that Ethiopian Airlines’ past experiences with security level 
in Hargeisa influences the ways in which the individual moves through the airports. Although 
HGA has mobilised certain international airport security norms, Ethiopian Airlines finds it 
necessary to have an additional layer of security. Additional layer of security is also a practice 
when looking at how HGA handles incoming luggage. 
(…) We [Mustafa Awad and I] went outside and walked out on the apron, we went into a 
new building. Here was a new luggage scanner. Mustafa told me that this machine was brand 
new. Luggage from arriving flights are carried in and scanned before they move on into the arrival 
terminal where travellers can pick them up. He told me that it was opened on March 28, he 
thought – not completely sure. Mustafa said: “luggage is normally not scanned on arrival – for 
instance a flight from Germany to Denmark – the airports trust each other in that the luggage 
scan on departure is good enough. But here in Hargeisa we want to check all luggage on arrival 
because not all connecting flights come from airports with high security standards”. He also told 
me that they are planning to install a conveyer belt wherefrom the traveller can pick up the 
luggage94. 
Thus, the security of HGA has additional layers. Ethiopian Airlines creates a set of security 
procedures on top of the already existing security practices, and the incoming luggage is 
scanned through the security system – a system that is not normally adapted in other airports 
both of which a recognition of the conflictual region HGA is situated in.  
This means that the ICAO standards and recommendations are modified in HGA in different 
ways, which have very specific impacts on mobility through the airport. I would like to make 
                                                 
93 Field diary, March 30, 2014 
94 Field notes, April 27, 2014 
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clear that I am not arguing for or against these double inspections. Rather, the point is that 
various actors negotiate the everyday regulation of airport mobility to comply with certain 
interests and regional risks. 
 
5.3 Part Conclusion: Constructing, Contesting, & Negotiating the 
State 
In the light of the newly implemented technologies and security practices at HGA, the current 
chapter has unfolded how mobility is regulated, negotiated, and contested at the border of the 
state.  
In the first part of the analysis, I found that the airport security practices are imbued in a power 
relation where the individual increasingly becomes knowable to the state by performing, what 
I have called, ‘confessional rites’ to the authoritative figure of the airport agent. I argue that 
these encounters are along other more symbolic practices and discourses part of manifesting 
Somaliland as a state with the right to examine the people crossing the border – in other words 
displaying sovereignty. On this basis, I further argued that the airport is a place where the 
image of Somaliland is constructed, or as one airport staff-member elegantly articulated it: the 
airport is the face of the nation. A face which he hopes will have features of safety, peace, and 
security. I argue that through these practices the state legitimises and naturalises their right to 
regulate mobility. In other words, the Somaliland state is manifested by enacting these 
practices and by the individual traveller’s acceptance of the same practices. In the second part, 
I have presented three cases demonstrated that the regulation of mobility are contested and 
negotiated in various daily encounters.  
I argue that it is exactly in these mundane everyday encounters that the contemporary state 
formation processes can be viewed. I detected a state in which land disputes are apparent,  
interactions between state authorities and individuals are increasingly based on an anonymised 
type of practice and a state in which regulations adopted from the international realm are 
negotiated locally. Thus, at this particular margin in the state I have seen a that the state is 
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constructed, negotiated and contested in everyday encounters between state representatives 
and a wide variety of actors. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have analysed the Somaliland state formation. A state that despite of its 
impressive achievements remains unrecognised by the international community. So far, 
Somaliland state formation processes have been analysed through its official politics and by 
its central state institutions. I decided to move beyond this analysis by adopting an 
anthropological approach to state formation processes. Instead of analysing the center of the 
state, I have turned my analytical lens towards the margins of the state. Specifically I chose to 
analyse Hargeisa Egal International Airport (HGA) as an institution on the border of 
Somaliland. I identified three themes at the airport that helped me shape the analysis of 
Somaliland and its state formation processes. 
Firstly, I analysed the state formation processes through the history of the airport. The airport 
was built during colonial times and the narrow interests of the British protectorate mirrored 
the minimum importance of the airport at the time.  After the creation of the Somali Republic, 
the airport was turned into a military base and became an arena violent conflicts between the 
resistance movement the SNM and the Somali National Army. Eventually the Somali Republic 
collapsed and today one of the flights that was used by the Somali National Army is used as a 
symbol of Somaliland’s break-away from the South. During the first years of Somaliland’s self-
claimed independence the state went through a period with conflicts over the right to different 
tax generators. The airport was yet again a central arena in these processes. Eventually the 
state took over the control of the airport. The renaming of the airport to Egal  after the 
President at the time, illustrates well the consolidation of the Somaliland state.  More recently, 
HGA has become an important tool in the broader state vision of making Somaliland a 
regional trade hub. To do so the airport is now undergoing most structured reformation in its 
lifespan. The main finding is that the airport has been a central arena where various actors 
have been involved in forming the state into what it is today. 
Secondly, I continued by looking at the current reformation of HGA, which is initiated as part 
of the broader strategy of becoming a regional trade hub. I found that the airport is being 
reformed by adapting to certain international norms, which have been internalised among the 
HGA authorities and its management. This has led to a reform of the airport in accordance 
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with neo-liberal logics of privatisation and competition thereby outsourcing state power i.e. 
by the coming private aviation authority. One of my main arguments is that the international  
norms are not imposed on the HGA management and authorities rather the HGA 
management and authorities strategically mobilise norms through a web of various actors to 
create an internationally recognised airport. In this sense, I argue that the airport becomes a 
locus wherefrom Somaliland can seek recognition outside more official recognition seeking 
venues. Furthermore, I found that HGA management and authorities have been using various 
ties to fund the two main reformation projects as well as international expert organisations to 
mobilise the standards and recommendations stemming from the international norms. This 
leads me to conclude that the HGA management and authorities are strategically using external 
resources in the reformation of HGA, a finding that nuances the findings presented in the 
predominant analysis of Somaliland state formation. 
Thirdly, I have looked at various encounters between airport agents and individuals. I found 
that current security practices submit the individual to examinations and interrogations, 
practices termed ‘confessional rites’. I argue that these encounters – or ‘confessional rites’- 
produce an image of Somaliland as an entity possessing the authority to control the mobility 
at HGA. The point is not that they should not have such an authority. Instead, the point is 
that this authoritative right is not a pre-given (also illustrated via the airport’s history) rather 
the authoritative right is constructed in the daily interactions at i.e. the airport.  Consequently,  
the airport practices construct an image of the Somaliland state as a safe, peaceful, and secure 
place as coined by one airport agent. In addition, through three cases I have exemplified how 
the airport practices are negotiated and contested, and I argue that it is in these everyday 
contestations and negotiations that contemporary state formation processes are best read. 
What I found is that some forms of mobility are promoted on the expense of other forms of 
mobility. Furthermore, the current type of relation between state representatives and 
individuals at border security practices is transforming towards a more anonymous type of 
practice. Lastly, I found that various actors are engaged in the negotiation of security and 
thereby shaping patterns of mobility. This has led me to conclude that the state is being 
constructed, negotiated, and contested on a daily basis demonstrating a state visible at its 
borders. 
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By looking away from the central state apparatus and towards the state in its margins I have 
found that the state has been recast from being a colonial state to a state seeking to become a 
regional trade hub. This journey has been conflictual as various actors have been competing 
and negotiating over the right to rule. By the use of a strategy best coined as a strategy of 
extraversion the current state formation proceeds through neo-liberal logics. Furthermore, the 
state constructs itself as a central entity with the authority to regulate mobility at its border. 
States are therefore historical constructs that are constantly undergoing transformations and 
constantly negotiated, contested, and reproduced in daily interactions between state authorities 
and individuals. It is important to mention that HGA is one border site of the state, and I argue 
that by looking at different border sites one might be able to further unfold Somaliland’s state 
formation processes. 
 
 
“The state is bones, flesh and soul: The bones are the structures: this we have 
The flesh is well educated human resources: this we don’t have 
The soul is here!” (Abdi, the local scholar) 
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